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THE ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS OF CATEGORY MANAGEMENT AND
CATEGORY CAPTAINS OF CONSUMER PRODUCTS
LEO S. CARAMELI, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the 1990s, the retail sale of consumer product goods
in the United States underwent a sea change. Grocers merged with
other grocers, leading to increased market concentration.' Controlling
more shelf space than ever before, these new mega-grocers now pos-
sess proportionally greater influence over consumer product manu-
facturers.2 Manufacturers have responded with strategies designed to
strengthen their relationships3 with the retailers, offering numerous
services along with the products they sell.' One frequent response is
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2004: B.S., Busi-
ness Economics and Management Information Systems. The Miami University, 1996. i wouldlike to thank my wife Kelley for her patience and support-without her, I never would have
completed this Note. I would also like to thank Professor Christopher R. Leslie for his encour-
agement and suggestions. Finally, thanks to Kelly M. Neff, who provided invaluable feedback.
1. Hayden Stewart & Steve Martinez, Innovation by Food Companies Key to Growth and
Profitability FOOD REV., May 1, 2002, at 28. 30 ("The nationwide market share of the fourlargest grocery chains reached 27.4 percent in 2000, compared with 17.0 percent in 1987."),
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publicationsFoodReview/Mav2102/frvol25i lf.pdf. Other
sources place the 2000 market share of the top four supermarkets closer to 42 percent. Federal
Trade Commission, Workshop on Slotting Allowances: Transcript of June 1, 2000 Proceedings
388 (testimony of Daniel Savrin), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/slotting/slotting6l.pdf (last
visited Mar. 22, 2004) [hereinafter FTC Slotting Day 2]. One author even argues that the Ameri-
can grocery market is structured in such a way that market concentration should be addressed
on a regional basis, yielding a four-firm market concentration increase from 49.3 percent in 1958
to 62.4 percent in 1987, based upon metropolitan areas of more than one million people. Wil-
liam H. Borghesani, Jr. ct al., Food for Thought. The Emergence of Pover Buyers and its Chal-
lenge to Competition Analysis, 4 STAN. J. L., Bus. & FIN. 39,45-46 (1999).
2. In addition to possessing supra-competitive market power, large retailers also control
manufacturers' access to consumers. See Borghesani, Jr. et al., supra note 1, at 42-43.
3. An alternative perspective is that manufacturers respond not to strengthen a relation-
ship, but as a response to explicit or implied threats by a retailer to sever or substantially
weaken an existing relationship. Certainly large retailers have been known to apply onerous
pressure on suppliers. See, e.g., id. at 50-51.
4. See Stewart & Martinez, supra note 1. at 28.
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to provide Category Management services free to certain retailers
that purchase the manufacturers' products.'
Category Management is a business practice by which a retailer
plans its strategy on a product-category level rather than on a brand-
by-brand basis.6 Products are grouped into commonly understood
categories such as toothpaste, shampoo, or more broadly, hair care.
One main objective of Category Management is to assess consumer
demand at the category level and stock store shelves in a way that
best reflects that demand.7 Once the Category Manager determines
who shops at the targeted retailer and what products those consumers
wish to purchase, they can design the category appropriately.8
Countless variables influence consumer purchasing decisions,
and Category Management focuses on those that a retailer can most
effectively leverage to drive sales. The four main decision points, or
components, of Category Management are choosing the most appro-
priate assortment, placement, pricing,9 and promotion of products
carried at the store level.10
5. Al Urbanski, Can of Corn: With a Steely Focus on Efficiency and Functionality, Del
Monte Makes Category Management Seem Simpler Than It Is, SUPERMARKET BuS., Nov. 1,
2001, at S10 (explaining that at Del Monte, Category Management is defined as "It]he combin-
ing of reasonably substitutable items into a single group that can be merchandised, priced, and
promoted to achieve specific financial and other results.").
6. Brandon Copple, Shelf-Determination: Under Betsy Holden, Kraft Foods is Winning the
War of the Aisles, FORBES, Apr. 15, 2002, at 130. 140.
7. Thomas K. Arnold, Wal-Mart's Captain of Home Video: Warner Has Acted us Chain's
Chief Adviser on Home Entertainment Since April 2001, VIDEO STORE, Apr. 14, 2002, at 1, 8.
8. Id.
9. The idea of a manufacturer making price recommendations to a retailer may be trou-
blesome to an antitrust academic, but it does not appear that the business world shares the same
fears. For instance, a recent article recommended that Category Captains seize greater control
over pricing decisions at the retail level. See generally John Phipps, Pricing For The 21st Cen-
tury: Winning the Price-Point Battle Profitably, SUPERMARKET NEWS, Jul. 16, 2001, at 22s ("As
category captains, manufacturers have expanded their relationships with retailers by taking on
the role of trusted advisers in all these areas. Until now, pricing has been conspicuously absent
from that list .... As supermarkets learn to use pricing more precisely to manage sales and
profits the category captain role will necessarily also incorporate this capability."). Moreover, in
his statement before Congress, Wisconsin Law Professor Peter C. Carstensen indicated that a
Category Captain might control all aspects of category decisions for a grocery store chain,
including "setting prices." Ensuring Competitive and Open Agricultural Markets: Are Meat
Packers Abusing Market Power?, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. (Aug. 23, 2002) (testimony of Peter C. Carstensen, Professor of Law, Wisconsin
Law School), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/print-testimony.cfm?id=382&wit-id=840;
see also Stewart & Martinez, supra note 1, at 28 (noting that Category Captains may at times
"suggesti] retail prices" to retailers); Copple, supra note 6, at 142 (describing Kraft's admitted
practice of instructing retailers "what to charge for each brand."). Furthermore, according to
Robert L. Steiner, the category plans that Category Captains submit can include pricing rec-
ommendations. FTC Slotting Day 2, supra note 1, at 367.
10. Product promotion is simply a form of advertising or marketing.
I Vol 79:1313
ANTITRUST AND CATEGORY CAPTAINS
Through focus on these four components, Category Management
has transformed the way grocers sell consumer products. What was
once trial and error is now a sophisticated marketing science.11 Con-
sumer desires, behaviors, values, beliefs, social norms, and prefer-
ences are closely studied and analyzed. 2 The findings from these
studies are then reflected not only in the features of the products con-
sumers purchase, but in the layout and design of supermarkets as
well. The resulting product assortment, price, promotion, and place-
ment have a dramatic effect on consumer decisions at the point of
purchase.3
Because Category Management strategy and implementation is
critical to a retailer's performance, it may be surprising to learn that
some retailers rely heavily upon manufacturers to make these deci-
sions for them.14 Despite recent mergers and growth, most supermar-
ket chains still spend relatively modest amounts on marketing at the
store level$5 and rarely possess the staffing and expertise necessary to
make educated Category Management decisions for themselves."
While retailers likely understand that perfecting Category Manage-
ment planning and implementation is critical to the success and
profit-maximizing performance of any given supermarket, they often
choose to pass the majority of these decisions along to manufacturers
from which the retailers purchase. 7
Large supermarket chains successfully pass Category Manage-
ment responsibilities along to manufacturers by appointing "Category
1i. See Robert L. Steiner, Category Management-A Pervasive, New Vertical / Horizontal
Format, ANTITRUST, Spring 2001, at 77, 77-78 (2001). For a brief discussion of how category
management works, see Ted Gladson, Crunch Numbers. Move Products, AFrERMARKET Bus.,
May 12, 2003, at 9, available at http://www.aftermarketbusiness.com/aftermarketbusiness/article/
articleDetail.jsp?id=55428 (discussing category management in the auto care business).
12. See generally Pollack Associates, Supermarkets and Their Shoppers (2002),
http://www.supermarketalert.com/pdf%20docs/2Shoppers.pdf.
13. See infra note 45.
14. See Copple, supra note 6, at 140; see also infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
15. See Copple, supra note 6, at 140.
16. See Steiner, supra note 11, at 80. Steiner notes that:
[U]nlike sizeable consumer goods manufacturing firms, even the largest retailing firms
have never had big staffs with personnel holding advanced degrees in management,
marketing, consumer behavior, statistics, and other relevant skills. And yet supermar-
kets and other mass purveyors of consumer goods can operate in over 200 categories
compared to less than 10 in the Category Captain's firm. So a single Category Manager
for the retailer is ordinarily responsible for numerous categories. Even Wal-Mart's
Category Managers have sometimes been stretched so thin that they cannot exercise
adequate supervision.
Id.
17. Id.
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Captains""8 to manage a portion of the chain's Category Management
efforts. A Category Captain is a single preferred manufacturer that
assumes responsibility for the Category Management planning and
implementation for one or more product category at a retail chain. As
such, the Category Captain, and not the retailer, analyzes store needs
and offers Category Management recommendations and services. For
each product category (e.g., toothpaste) the retailer relinquishes ex-
clusive control of Category Management related decisions to the
manufacturer that offers the best package of services."' Typically the
services include full-time personnel to produce "plan-o-grams,"20 rec-
ommend prices,21 manage promotional activities, 2 reset shelves and
clean stores,23 and purchase and analyze costly market data. 24 These
are the primary tasks that go into making and executing informed
Category Management decisions.
This arrangement often results in business relationships condu-
cive to opportunistic behavior by the Category Captain. For instance,
in almost every potential Category Captain arrangement the chosen
manufacturer performs Category Management tasks not only for its
own brands, but for those of competing manufacturers as well. Fur-
thermore, the same manufacturer may also serve as Category Captain
for multiple retailers competing in the same market. 5 Even more
surprising, despite the significant effort and expense that a manufac-
turer must expend to serve as Category Captain and the undeniable
value conferred to the retailer, sometimes retailers demand a cash
payment in exchange for the privilege of serving.26 As will be
18. Id. at 77.
19. Some retail chains reserve the final say in what changes are implemented while others
do not; there is a broad spectrum of practices across the industry. See Federal Trade Commis-
sion, Report on the Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Slotting Allowances and Other
Marketing Practices in the Grocery Industry 48 (Feb. 2001), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/02/slottingallowancesreportfinal.pdf [hereinafter FTC Slotting Final].
20. See Steiner, supra note 11, at 77 (explaining that a "plan-o-gram" is a visual depiction
of where each product in a given category should be shelved).
21. See supra note 9.
22. Steiner, supra note 11, at 77.
23. See Mark Tosh, Third Party Merchandisers: Who's Minding the Store?, PROGRESSIVE
GROCER, Aug. 1998, at 89, 89-90 (discussing the emerging debate over which party will fund
store shelf resetting activities).
24. See Copple, supra note 6, at 142.
25. See Urbanski, supra note 5. Del Monte claims to serve as Category Captain at almost
all of the top twenty-five wholesalers and retailers nationwide. Id.
26. David Merrefield, Your Payment, My Captain?, SUPERMARKET NEWS, June 10, 1996,
at 2 (describing "captaincy fees for Category Management partnerships between supermarkets
and food manufacturers"). In fact, in 1996 a national drug chain was charging $100,000 to serve
as captain. Richard Turcsik, Go Beyond ECR, Consultant Urges, SUPERMARKET NEWS, Dec.
[Vol 79:1313
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discussed, infra Part II, these payments may by themselves signal anti-
trust concerns.
Intuitively the Category Captain relationship is like the "fox
guarding [the] henhouse. ' 27 Choosing which products to sell and how
to price, shelve, and promote them is a job that most logically and
traditionally belongs to the retailer itself, and not a manufacturer.
After all, the manufacturer is concerned primarily with its own brands
and has a vested interest in seeing competing products fail.28 The re-
tailer, on the other hand, has a vested interest in maximizing overall
profit in its stores, regardless of brand.29 It seems, then, that there is a
fundamental difference between a Category Captain's business goals
30, 1996, at 23. When one begins to consider that not only are manufacturers spending a gooddeal of resources to manage a category for a retailer, but are paying for the "privilege" of doing
so, it begins to appear as though retailers may be exerting monopsony-like influence even over
large manufacturers.
27. Copple. supra note 6, at 132. Furthermore, at least one retailer has opined that "Islome
manufacturers and brokers don't really understand category management, some don't look at
categories without bias and some are not aligning their category strategies to the retailer." Les
Hill, Challenging an Assumption, PROGRESSIVE GROCER, Jan. 1, 1997, at 17.
28. According to Don Sussman of Ahold's Stop & Shop grocery chain, if a manufacturer
can displace a competitor's better selling product, then that manufacturer benefits even if the
store does not. Federal Trade Commission, Workshop on Slotting Allowances: Transcript of
May 31, 2000 Proceedings 90, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/slotting/slotting531.pdf [herein-
after FTC Slotting Day 11. The manufacturer likely also has an interest in the overall profitabil-
ity and financial health of its retailers, but all else being equal, the manufacturer would want to
see as much of that retailer's profits come from the manufacturer's own products.
29. Al Urbanski, Captains Courageous, SUPERMARKET BUS., Nov. 1, 2001, at S3 (observ-
ing that "Retailers care not whether a category captain grows its own share; retailers care
whether category captains grow their entire categories."). Certainly the retailer does have a
vested interest in selling more of the most profitable brands it carries. Nevertheless, there are
valid business reasons that may motivate a retailer to stock less profitable brands. For instance,
Ukrop's Kevin Hade indicates that his grocery stores will carry an item that does not appear
good on paper, but which his highest volume shoppers tend to purchase. FTC Slotting Day 2,
supra note 1, at 339. In addition, retailers frequently offer certain items at unusually low prices
simply to draw consumers into the store, hoping they will purchase other items as well. See
Alexander Coolidge, Supermarkets Drive Traffic with Lower Gas Prices, CINCINNATI POST,
Sep. 5, 2003, at C7, available at http://www.cincypost.com/2003/09/05/krogergasO9O5O3.html
(noting that "gasoline is a way to drive customers into II stores to buy other things"). Still, it
seems evident that the underlying motivation for stocking these less profitable brands is to
maximize total profit in the category or retail store as a whole. The manufacturer, however,
would not necessarily share the same perspective and goal. The manufacturer, it seems, would
be interested in these ancillary products only to the extent that their absence would prevent a
consumer from purchasing the manufacturer's own product at that or any other retailer in the
relevant market. While it may seem difficult to reconcile the inherent conflict in a Category
Captain that desires only to maximize its own brand sales, with a retailer that seeks to maximize
category profits regardless of brand, a recent study supports the conclusion that manufacturers
may be providing Category Captain services only due to pressure from retailers. The study
notes that while Category Management has proven profitable to retailers, "both consumers andbrand owners lose out .... Consumers pay higher prices while suppliers get lower prices." Tim
Ambler, Category Management is Best Deployed for Brand Positioning, MARKETING, Nov. 29,
2001, at 18.
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and those of the retailer it serves. One logical conclusion, therefore, is
that the retailer is the more appropriate party to perform category
management tasks.30
Moreover, the Category Captain practice becomes even more
suspicious when one considers that a single manufacturer may be
making all of a retailer's decisions regarding competing manufactur-
ers' products.3 In the words of Commissioner Thomas Leary of the
Federal Trade Commission, "[a]s an antitrust matter, it seems rather
strange that you'd have one company advising a store on how to han-
dle the product of its competitors. ' 32 Indeed, this practice appears
even stranger when one considers that companies are recommending
retail prices.
Certainly it is possible that a Category Captain will perform its
duty with no other goal than to do what is best for the supermarket
and the consumer, attempting only to reap the benefits of a fine-
tuned supermarket by maximizing the efficiency of the product cate-
gory as a whole.33 But there are complications to this paradigm that
merit serious consideration from academia and the court system: the
anticompetitive potential and reality, and antitrust implications of
Category Management and Captain practices.
This Note focuses on Category Captains and Category Manage-
ment as they apply to the consumer product industry, primarily within
the grocery store segment. 34 In their most innocuous implementations,
30. Even if a manufacturer possesses specialized knowledge of a given category, the final
decision still logically falls on the retailer.
31. Steiner, supra note 11, at 77.
32. Copple, supra note 6, at 136.
33. There are certainly hypothetical examples of stores in which revamping poorly de-
signed categories may yield an overall increase in sales for the entire category. Naturally, the
manufacturer with the dominant product in a category will see a benefit from doing category
management work, despite also providing a benefit to its competitors. For instance, Kraft Foods
has demonstrated that by properly shelving pourable and spoonable salad dressings, stores can
realize a sales volume increase in both. See John Karolefski, The New Category Captain,
SUPERMARKET NEWS, June 30, 2003, at 53, 56. Still, it is simply not rational for one manufac-
turer to spend its money to provide these services only to benefit its competitors in an equal
amount. At minimum, the manufacturer must recoup its investment plus any amount of revenue
that it may lose to its competitors in the process in order to justify the effort. If this does not
occur, the behavior is not likely rational. In such instances, it would be wise to ask whether the
manufacturer is recouping its investment in some other way, or whether the manufacturer has
been unduly coerced into providing services to the retailer.
34. This Note focuses on the grocery segment of consumer products retailing because of
the recent wave of mergers and the corresponding increase in market concentration within the
segment. To the extent possible the author has limited discussion to grocery stores. Neverthe-
less, commentary regarding Category Captain practices in other market segments, e.g., mass
retailers such as Wal-Mart or video stores, have been included to help complete gaps in
research. Antitrust concerns are likely equally as valid in these other market segments.
I Vol 79:1313
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Category Captaincies probably do not violate antitrust laws. Category
Management as retailers and manufacturers sometimes practice it,
however, can help facilitate anticompetitive conduct by one manufac-
turer intended to exclude other manufacturers' products from the
marketplace. 35 It may also lead to collusion amongst grocers that act
to restrain competition. Finally, Category Captaincies as thev are
often implemented present significant opportunity for larger retailers
to coerce Category Management services from manufacturers that a
manufacturer does not, or cannot, offer smaller stores on proportion-
ally equal terms, thus presenting Robinson-Patman Act concerns. 36
Part I of this Note provides a brief discussion of the goals and
purpose of antitrust law. Those familiar with antitrust law may wish to
proceed to Part II11 Part II of this Note presents an overview of Cate-
gory Management, Category Captains, and corresponding practices.
Part III focuses on potential violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act stemming from certain implementations of Category
Management and Category Captain practices. This part details the
potential for collusive resale price maintenance agreements, and for
misrepresentation and tampering by a malicious Category Captain.
Part IV of this Note analyzes potential violations of Section 2 of the
Robinson-Patman Act that may result from common implementa-
tions of these practices. Most importantly, this section addresses the
need for manufacturers to offer all services to competing retailers on
proportionally equal terms. Part V of this Note presents recommen-
dations for altering category management implementations in a way
that retains legitimate benefits to manufacturers and retailers, but
which may reduce the risk of violating antitrust laws.
35. See, e.g., Conwood Co., L.P. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002).
In Conwood, one Category Captain destroyed shelf displays and hid product of a competitor.Id. at 778. It also misled retailers as to the product assortment and shelf placement best for the
retailer. Id. at 776.
36. Although the Robinson-Patman Act receives much criticism and is not heavily liti-gated, the FTC has expressed a willingness to enforce the act if a proper challenge is filed. SeeFTC Slotting Day 2, supra note 1, at 460 (comments of David Balto, then Assistant Director for
Policy and Evaluation in the FTC's Bureau of Competition).
37. Part I makes no attempt to debate the various schools of antitrust, nor the relative
strengths of Cournot, Stigler, Bain, or even Posner. The analysis presented in this Note isintended to provide an overview of an emerging antitrust concern and assumes only that anti-
trust law is necessary on at least some level to maintain an economic structure conducive to
competitive behavior. No attempt is made to choose a specific model of oligopolistic competi-
tion. To the extent that any viewpoint is implied, such an implication was unintentional.
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I. THE GOALS AND PURPOSE OF ANTITRUST LAW
Antitrust, as with many or most other bodies of law, emerged as
a way to help achieve an overriding goal considered by society as
beneficial. With criminal law, society has rules to deter and punish
criminals, hoping to make our lives a bit safer. For business it has
accounting laws, hoping to provide investors the opportunity to make
educated investment decisions. At the intersection of business and
criminal laws, society also has antitrust. Antitrust laws were instituted
to ensure that the American marketplace remained a competitive
one.3"
Nevertheless, it is certainlytrue that competition is not the only
way to allocate societal resources. Societies across the globe survive
and sometimes even prosper with varying degrees of non-competitive,
more centrally controlled market structures. But America has consis-
tently espoused the largess of capitalism, a necessary part of which is
an economy where competition exists to govern behavior.39
Just as a safe world requires criminal laws and enforcement, a
competitive economy requires laws to encourage those with a procliv-
ity to misbehave to act competitively. This is where antitrust laws
come in. Without these laws, society would have fewer means by
which to regulate the behavior of those whose views do not agree
with the broader societal vision-with those who decide it is in their
own best interest to eliminate their competition not by building a
better or cheaper mousetrap, but instead through incorrigible and
nefarious acts. The basic tenet of antitrust law's goals, therefore, is to
create a system whereby economic power in any given industry is
spread out among numerous competitors.40 This, in turn, ensures that
38. See Harry S. Gerla, Restoring Rivalry as a Central Concept in Antitrust Law, 75 NEB. L.
REV. 209 (1996) (explaining that antitrust exists to maintain an environmcnt in which rivalry
between firms can flourish).
39. A competitive marketplace is not to be confused with free and unrestrained "competi-
tion." A competitive marketplace assumes that every participant has the opportunity to com-
pete based upon the virtue of its product or service, unimpeded by constraints such as price
fixing or market collusion. Furthermore, it should be noted that while competition can exist in
non-capitalist economies, competition is typically viewed as a necessary condition for market
capitalism. See, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization
of Law: Lessons from Antitrust, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 557, 604 (1994) ("Competition policy ... is
the jurisprudence of capitalism, and it speaks to a society's view of the role and the relationship
of the individual, the enterprise and the government in a pluralistic society and economy.").
40. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co.. 334 U.S. 495, 536 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Douglas notes that:
The philosophy of the Sherman Act is that [firms with significant market power]
should not exist. For all power tends to develop into a government in itself. Power that
controls the economy should be in the hands of elected representatives of the people,
I Vol 79:1313
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no single player leverages its size to the detriment of other, less-
powerful firms.
For example, consider a hypothetical widget industry4' If widgets
are a good that consumers want, or even need, and are willing and
able to pay a price that is greater than or equal to the marginal cost of
production' 2 then firms will emerge as producers of widgets to meet
consumer demand43 Assume that some consumers are willing and
able to pay between $1.00 and $1.10 per widget. Assume also that
producers can produce widgets at a marginal cost of $1.0044 and that
all widgets are of roughly equal quality. In a perfectly competitive
economy each producer is a price-taker, meaning it has no ability to
influence market price. Therefore, with 1000 manufacturers compos-
ing roughly equal shares of the market, it would be quite difficult for
one producer to raise its price to $1.10, even though it is well aware
certain consumers value the widget that highly. If that producer did,
those consumers would merely purchase a different brand of widgets
still selling at $1.00.
Given the abundance of producers, none if acting alone has the
ability to raise its price even as high as $1.01. To do so, that producer
would need some insurance that other producers would also raise
prices. Antitrust law exists in part to help make certain that firms do
not devise ways to create this insurance by forming cartels, entering
collusive pricing arrangements, or devising other disreputable prac-
tices.
This is the competitive model in its simplest rendition-every
firm fighting for itself, attempting to earn a profit by producing the
not in the hands of an industrial oligarchy. Industrial power should be decentralized. It
should be scattered into many hands so that the fortunes of the people will not be de-pendent on the whim or caprice, the political prejudices, the emotional stability of a
few self-appointed men. The fact that they are not vicious men but respectable and so-
cial minded is irrelevant. That is the philosophy and the command of the Sherman Act.
It is founded on a theory of hostility to the concentration in private hands of power so
great that only a government of the people should have it.
Id.
41. This is admittedly oversimplified, but is used here as an illustration.
42. Marginal cost is the cost to the manufacturer of producing one additional unit.
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITSPRACTICE §l.lb (2d. ed. 1999). Maureen O'Rourke, Shaping Competition on the Internet: Who
Owns Product and Pricing Information?. 53 VAND. L. REV. 1965, 1968 n.4 (2000). While not
truly measurable in a real world sense, marginal cost is useful for theoretical analysis.
43. The consumer's demand curve in a simplified perfectly competitive economy will be
horizontal, meaning that price is the same at any level of output. HOVENKAMP, supra note 42, at
8.
44. This cost includes, of course, salaries and other production costs.
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best product at the lowest possible price. Still, at times firms may pre-
fer to sell at higher margins by either offering a lesser quality product
at the same price or the same quality product at a higher price.45 To
achieve this, the firm must find a way to prevent other firms from
meeting consumer demand for the higher quality product at the lower
price. Short of the previously mentioned collusive agreements, one of
the most effective ways to achieve this is by gaining a larger market
share and devising ways to make it too costly for others to enter the
market. In this scenario, a firm can, indeed, raise its prices because
there will not be enough competing firms to produce and sell the less
expensive widget, nor will others be able to enter the widget market
easily. A firm that achieves both market power and entry barriers can
therefore sell its widgets for between $1.01 and $1.10. Certainly, this
will price some consumers out of the widget market and charge others
a greater percentage of their reservation price,4" but this is not the
firm's concern. It is, however, of concern to society.
Antitrust laws seek minimize market power by enforcing a mar-
ket structure whereby firms must by law compete on the merits of
their products or services. When a firm expends its resources for the
sole purpose of excluding its competitors to gain market share rather
than producing the best product or service at an attractive price, soci-
ety does not benefit as much as it otherwise would. Certainly, the firm
gains, but the industry as a whole is hurt. Society and consumers are
as well.
Competition, on the other hand, benefits consumers in several
ways. First, price discipline47 ensures that manufacturers sell goods at
the marginal cost of production. This is the lowest price at which a
manufacturer can sell and remain profitable. As such, competition
ensures that all consumers that value a good at or above this price can
purchase the good, thus maximizing societal benefit.48 Furthermore,
competition provides the ancillary benefit of freeing resources of
45. Selling a lesser quality product at a lower price or a higher quality product at a higher
price is, of course, legitimate.
46. A person's reservation price is the maximum they are willing to pay. In the current
example, some consumers have a reservation price of $1.00, meaning that they will not purchase
a widget at $1.01. Still, some have a reservation price of $1.05. When widgets are selling at the
competitive price of $1.00, this consumer is said to have a "consumer surplus" of $).05.
Nevertheless, this consumer would buy still buy the widget at a higher price, up to $1.05.
47. Price discipline means that there arc enough rivals competing for a consumer's dollar
that each is compelled to keep prices as low as possible.
48. Consumer surplus is essentially the difference between what a consumer pays for a
product and the maximum amount they would have been willing to pay.
[Vol 79:1313
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those who value the good at a price greater than marginal cost to pur-
chase other goods or services. This, of course, benefits society even
further. It is for these reasons that antitrust laws seek to maintain a
competitive marketplace.
Therefore, seeking to protect consumers from potentially abusive
producers, Congress passed the Sherman Act and later the Robinson-
Patman Act. In doing so, Congress sought to limit market power and
related concerns. Accordingly, antitrust exists to maintain an econ-
omy in which firms find it in their best interest to behave competi-
tively. Part II of this Note provides an overview of Category
Management and Category Captain practices. Parts III and IV will
explain how current antitrust doctrine should be applied to potential
anticompetitive behavior that results from these practices. Finally,
Part V will present recommendations for implementing the Category
Captain relationship in a way that minimizes antitrust concerns.
II. CATEGORY MANAGEMENT AND CATEGORY CAPTAIN
OVERVIEW
A. What is Category Management?
Category Management is a practice by which a retailer decides
what products to sell and how to sell them. Faced with limited shelf
space, a retailer must choose carefully which products it wishes to
offer local consumers. Moreover, retailers must select from a myriad
of ways to shelve and price those products. Category Management
provides a methodology by which retailers make these decisions, di-
viding products into easily managed groups known as categories. A
category can be as simple as "toothpaste" or as broad as "oral care."
The most prominent factors that a retailer can leverage to im-
prove category performance are: (1) the assortment of products the
store carries; (2) the placement of those individual products on the
shelf relative to other products in the category, the placement of en-
tire categories within the store relative to other categories, and how
much total shelf space to allot a category and each individual product
therein; (3) the price of the product relative to both its reasonable
substitutes in the same store and comparable products at other retail-
ers in the same geographic market; and (4) the promotion of the
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product. 49 Each of these factors has profound impact on individual
consumers' purchasing decisions.50 For instance, it is well established
that moving a product to eye-level has a dramatic effect on how well a
product sells.51
B. Category Management and Category Captains-Retailer and
Manufacturer Collaboration
Category Management emerged in the 1990s as an outgrowth of
Wal-Mart's 52 efforts to improve the way it partnered with its suppli-
ers.53 Category Management's predecessor was a form of vertical
partnership in which Wal-Mart partnered with individual manufac-
turers to increase efficiency in its supply chain relationships. 54 Under
the previous paradigm, no manufacturer had any influence over any
other manufacturer's products. 55 Category Management as imple-
mented by means of a Category Captain, on the other hand, takes
these partnerships to the next level by allowing a single manufacturer
to control decisions of an entire product category within a given retail
chain? 6 In doing so, implementers of Category Management seek to
gain efficiencies and influence consumer purchasing behavior at the
retail store? 7
Given the close collaborative relationship that results when a re-
tail chain appoints a Category Captain to manage its stores by prod-
uct category instead of by individual product or brand, the retailer has
49. See Steiner, supra note 11, at 77.
50. See generally Barbara Murray, Easy Pickings: Independent Stays Ahead in St. Louis by
Making Sure Customers Find it Easy to Shop at Schnucks, SUPERMARKET NEWS, Dec. 17, 2001,
at 35. Furthermore, Category Management can result in significant savings for a retailer. For
instance, the H.E. Butt Grocery Company claims that Category Management enabled it to save
$12 million annually. See Steiner, supra note 11, at 78.
51. See, e.g., Robert L. Steiner, The Nature and Benefits of National Brand/Private Label
Competition at 12 (working paper presented at Annual Meeting of the American Economic
Association, Jan. 5, 2002), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/174.pdf. Steiner
points out that "'a couple of facings at eye level [will do] more for [a] product than five facings
on the bottom shelf"' Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis removed). The logical conclusion is,
therefore, that manufacturers have a vested interest in fighting vigorously to win beneficial
placement for their products.
52. See Amanda Berragan, Category Management Insight: The Love/Hate Relationship,
RETAIL WORLD, Jul. 8, 2002, at 40 (attributing the emergence of Category Management to
WaIl-Mart's retail efforts).
53. See Steiner, supra note 11, at 77.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 77-78.
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less need to maintain close relationships with multiple manufacturers
within a given category.58 In fact, doing so could lead to confusion or
redundancies. The reason for this is that a hypothetical retailer has
only one business strategy. To achieve the business objectives of that
strategy, there is likely some optimal mix of products the retailer
should carry. Each product category also has optimal product place-
ment, promotion, and pricing schemes. Assuming that the advocates
of Category Captain relationships are correct in asserting that manu-
facturers provide only honest and accurate suggestions that will best
meet the retailer's business objectives, there is little need for recom-
mendations, data, or input from a second manufacturer. In fact, a
retailer does not likely have the staff or the time to meet with each
manufacturer within a given category to hear detailed input that is
substantially the same. Making time to listen to feedback from multi-
ple manufacturers in a category would, then, be redundant. To pre-
vent this redundancy, some retailers instead choose a single
manufacturer to be the "Category Captain," conferring the responsi-
bility to make the retailer's Category Management decisions for an
entire category of products59
C. Only the Big Survive: Which Manufacturers Serve as Category
Captains?
Analyzing consumer behavior and implementing Category Man-
agement plans is a costly venture. Nevertheless, retailers sometimes
charge a fee for the privilege.60 Therefore, it is often only the leading
manufacturers that can afford to compete for the captaincy.6' In light
of this, the fact that some manufacturers pay for the opportunity to
spend their money to perform research and planning for their retailer
58. Category managers at certain chains may look to confirm that all manufacturers agree
on the decisions. For some categories at certain retailers, however, the entire category is turned
over to the Category Captain. FTC Slotting Day 2, supra note 1, at 343-44. Furthermore, it has
been asserted that even Wal-Mart, with its mammoth size and resources, does not always have
sufficient personnel to oversee all of a Category Captain's decisions. See Steiner, supra note 11,
at 80.
59. See Steiner, supra note 11, at 77. Theoretically, a manufacturer just submits a plan for
approval and it is up to the retailer to determine where to go from there. In practice, retailers
follow divergent practices. See generally supra note 5. Some use a Category Captain and a sec-
ond manufacturer to check or "validat[e]" the Captains recommendations. See Ted Gladson,
Merchandising: The Category Captain Steers the Ships, AFTERMARKET Bus., April 1, 2003, at 8,
available at http://www.aftermarketbusiness.com/aftermarketbusiness/article/articleDetail.
jsp?id=51515.
60. See Merrefield, supra note 26, at 2.
61. See infra note 64.
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customer should by itself raise suspicion. In the words of C. Manly
Molpus, president and chief executive officer of the Grocery Manu-
facturers of America, 62
[t]he fundamental reason to [perform certain Category Manage-
ment work] ... is [to facilitate] both partners' understanding of the
value of working together to reduce costs so they both become
more efficient and more profitable and serve the consumer better.
That should drive partnerships, rather than [a requirement to] buy
your way into a partnership. 63
Moreover, even absent an entrance fee, smaller manufacturers
may not have the opportunity to serve as Category Captains.64 This
places them in a position less favorable to building and maintaining
key relationships with retailers. Likewise, smaller retailers often do
not have the clout to demand Category Captain services from a
manufacturer, 65 and therefore may be similarly disadvantaged vis-A-
vis larger retailers by having to perform Category Management work
on their own.
Furthermore, it is safe to assume that, all else being equal, a
manufacturer would prefer that a retailer itself perform all necessary
Category Management tasks and absorb the corresponding costs.
Even in an environment where that is not feasible, however, it is
likely that a manufacturer in a competitive marketplace would not see
62. The Grocery Manufacturers of America is a trade group representing grocery manufac-
turers. See generally About GMA, http://www.gmabrands.com/aboutlindex.cfm (last visited
March 15, 2004).
63. See Merrefield, supra note 26, at 2.
64. The opportunity to serve as Category Captain "goes by default to the dominant manu-
facturers" in a given category. JUDITH CORSTJENS & MARCEL CORSTJENS, STORE WARS: THE
BATTLE FOR MINDSPACE AND SHELFSPACE 291 (1999). In fact, smaller manufacturers often
have difficulty getting their products on the store shelf in the first place. See Alby Gallun, Small
Fry Take On Big Brands: Shelf Squeeze; Local Food Makers Facing a Tougher Fight To Win
Space in Supermarkets, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus., Sep. 17, 2001, at 17; see also FTC Slotting Day 1,
supra note 1, at 76-78. (comments of Scott Hannah of Pacific Valley Foods, a small manufac-
turer. Hannah discusses slotting fees from $100 to $300 per store, and aggregate values as high
as $100,000. He notes that, "If you're not going to pay ... don't bother coming in. It's that
pointed."); Steiner, supra note 11, at 79. Furthermore, manufacturers with market power may
even be able to resist paying a Captaincy fee, where smaller manufacturers cannot. See Merre-
field, supra note 26, at 2. Certainly the manufacturer will still absorb the high cost of providing
Category Management services, but reduction or elimination of a Captaincy fee can provide still
another benefit to a large manufacturer over its smaller competitor.
65. See Robert J. Aalberts & L. Lynn Judd, Slotting in the Retail Grocery Business: Does it
Violate the Public Policy Goal of Protecting Businesses Against Price Discrimination?, 40
DEPAUL L. REV. 397, 401 (199t) (noting that small, independent grocers have a difficult time
competing with large chains).
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fit to pay for the right to serve as Category Captain, only to then
benefit its competitors as much as it does itself.66
One possible motivation for a manufacturer to pay is that it is
really purchasing a chance at obtaining monopoly or oligopoly power
at the retail level. While it is not likely that a retailer would permit a
manufacturer to eliminate heavily demanded products, certainly the
Category Captain's products have a better chance of prevailing at the
retailer than those of competing manufacturers.67 A second, likely
related, possibility is that in charging a Captaincy fee the retailer is
actually seeking to recover a portion of the manufacturer's share of
consumer surplus.68 Under this theory, a retailer is well aware that
manufacturers need its commodity, limited shelf space. As such, in
exchange for a cash payment, the retailer relinquishes control of the
shelf decision-making to a Category Captain. Under this scenario, the
Captain pays because it knows that if it does not, its competitor will.
Category Management emerged as a way for producers and re-
tailers to join together to improve retailing strategy. For many logical
product groupings, the retailer appoints, sometimes at a fee, a pre-
ferred retailer to serve as Category Captain. The Captain then ana-
lyzes the product category and makes recommendations on what
products the retailer should carry in its stores, and how the retailers
should shelve, price, and promote those products. In a textbook im-
plementation, this practice may not present an antitrust problem.
Nevertheless, the collaborative and trusting nature of the relationship
presents numerous opportunities for antitrust violations.
66. As discussed, supra note 33, there are situations where the mere implementation of
Category Management will boost performance of an entire category. It is likely safe to assume
that the Category Captain's product(s) composes a greater percentage of the category than its
competitors and that it will, therefore, experience more net growth. Still, it is difficult to con-
ceive of a scenario in which paying a captaincy fee would not significantly ameliorate that incen-
tive. As such, the manufacturer rationally must derive some benefit worth paying for. Assuming
that Category Captains do not seek to give their brands treatment preferential to competitors'
brands, then the only remaining benefit worth paying for is a solid relationship with the retailer.
Such a relationship, however, likely provides maximum benefits only when the manufacturer
can leverage it to the detriment of competitors.
67. See, e.g., William Smyth, Wild Oats Implements Category Management Program,
SUPERMARKET NEWS, June 28, 1999. at 31. Jim Lee, president of Wild Oats Markets asserts
that a "category captain will ... have the edge in a tie." Id. It is not difficult to imagine that in
situations that are close (but not a tie), the Captain will still have the edge.
68. Consumer surplus is essentially the difference between what a consumer pays for a
product and the maximum amount they would have been willing to pay. The retailer could also
achieve this by raising retail prices. In that scenario, however, other retailers could undercut itsprice and the retailer would lose sales. By charging a Category Captaincy fee, the retailer can
maintain the same retail price and keep more of the profits to itself.
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The remainder of this Note will explore the potential antitrust
complications that may arise from a Category Captain relationship.
Part III will explore how potential collusion or other anticompetitive
activities facilitated by such arrangements may implicate Sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act. Part IV will then consider the Robinson-
Patman Act's requirement that Category Captains make services
available to all customers on a proportionally equal basis. Finally,
Part V will provide recommendations for implementing the Category
Captain relationship in a way that minimizes antitrust concerns.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SECTIONS I AND 2 OF THE SHERMAN
ACT ON CATEGORY MANAGEMENT AND CATEGORY CAPTAINS
Holding the position of most-favored manufacturer and serving
as Category Captain for even one product category within a given
supermarket chain affords the chosen manufacturer a significant
voice in that retailer's shelf-level decisions.69 When viewed in light of
the sheer size of today's retail chains, 0 the incentive for a manufac-
turer to contribute resources for a requesting retailer is compelling.7t
Manufacturers by their very nature also have an incentive to maxi-
mize sales and market share of their own products to the detriment of
their competitors.72 This incentive, combined with the increased influ-
ence resulting from the manufacturer's newfound partnership with
the retailer, may entice certain manufacturers to behave in ways that
violate the Sherman Act.
69. Some retailers take suggestions from the Category Captain and make their own deci-
sions, while others allow the Category Captain to be the final decision-maker. See supra note 19.
70. Leading grocery chain SUPERVALU controls 1,358 retail grocery locations. NCR,
SUPERVALU Selects NCR Self-Checkout; Leading Grocery Chain Installing NCR FastLane,
http://www.ncr.com/media-information/20(2/oct/pr102902.htm (Oct. 29, 2002). Furthermore, in
2002 chain supermarkets accounted for 65.4 percent of all supermarkets nationwide while inde-
pendents make up 34.6 percent. Food Marketing Institute, Facts & Figures: Key Facts: Number
of Stores, http://www.fini.org/facts-figs/keyfacts/stores.htm (May 2003). Nevertheless, chain
supermarkets accounted for 82.7 percent of all sales while independents accounted for only 17.3
percent. Food Marketing Institute, Facts & Figures: Key Facts: Grocer), Store Sales,
http://www.fmi.org/facts-figs/keyfacts/grocery.htm (2003); see also supra note 1.
71. One would expect there to also be a strong incentive for a manufacturer to decline the
opportunity. Theoretically, assuming Category Captains do nothing more than provide category
suggestions that are truly in the best interest of the retailer, then there would be a strong disin-
centive to reject the Category Captain position (or even pay for it) and merely free ride. Only in
the unique situation where overall category sales could be legitimately increased in a way the
covers the manufacturer-captain's costs and does not lend more to competitors' bottom lines
than the captain's would saying yes be rational.
72. See, e.g., supra note 28.
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Section 1 of the Sherman Act condemns every contract, combi-
nation, or conspiracy that unreasonably restrains trade or com-
merce.73 Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it an offense for a
company to monopolize,,or attempt to monopolize, trade or com-
merce.74 This Part will discuss Section 1 violations resulting from re-
sale price maintenance agreements. Furthermore, this Part will also
address potential Section 2 violations whereby a Category Captain
achieves monopoly power by affirmatively misleading a retailer
through inaccurate Category Management advice, or by sabotaging
its competitors' in-store Category Management work.
A. Sherman Act Section 1
Consumer goods operate within a combination of two or more
markets. The manufacturer first sells the product to a retailer or
wholesaler. Thereafter, a retailer eventually sells the product directly
to a consumer. Each of these transactions represents a market that
ideally behaves competitively to bring consumers goods they desire at
the lowest possible price.15 Category Captaincies can result in an ex-
clusive vertical relationship between a retail chain and a single manu-
facturer within the subject category.7 6 By its very nature, this exclusive
arrangement reduces or eliminates competition."7 Still, the relation-
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000.000
if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding
three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a
corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id.
75. It is true that to some degree consumer brand loyalty negates some competition at the
manufacturer level by rendering a relatively inelastic demand curve. Warren S. Grimes, Brand
Marketing, Intrabrand Competition, and the Multibrand Retailer: The Antitrust Law of Vertical
Restraints, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 83, 95 (1995). Still, ideally the market remains free for competi-
tors to develop brand loyalty for their own brands.
76. See Steiner, supra note 11, at 77-78; see also supra note 19.
77. When a given supermarket chain deals with a single Category Captain, competition is
reduced or eliminated between manufacturers competing for influence over in-store decision-
making.
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ship may not necessarily negatively affect the competitive market to
the extent necessary to give rise to antitrust concerns. For instance,
cooperation between a manufacturer and a retailer can have pro-
competitive effects by helping to ensure that the retailer carries a
distribution of products most appropriate for local consumers, and
that the products are shelved, priced, and promoted in an optimal
manner.
There are numerous decisions, however, that a retailer and
manufacturer could collectively reach that would serve to harm com-
petition and violate antitrust laws. One rather troublesome example is
an agreement between a single manufacturer and a single retailer to
fix retail prices." More problematic are potential agreements between
a single Category Captain and multiple retailers to fix retail prices.79
The discussion in Part II.A.1 illustrates both problems.,
While antitrust laws prohibit most price fixing, the mere discus-
sion of price between retailer and manufacturer requires further con-
sideration. As discussed, retail pricing is one of the main components
of category management decision-making. Therefore, in a vertical
relationship between manufacturer and retailer81 it may be acceptable
for a Category Captain to analyze the category and proffer objective
price recommendations to the retailer.8 2 A retailer is then at liberty to
78. This practice is known as vertical resale price maintenance.
79. This would result in a combination of a vertical resale price maintenance violation as
well as a horizontal price-fixing facilitated by a horizontal agent. Furthermore, this would be
more problematic because it could eliminate all competition in a given market and with the
Captain monitoring prices produce a relatively stable cartel.
80. While it is clear that the complexities of any given situation could lead to either a Sec-
tion 1 or a Section 2 violation, this Part concentrates on Section 1 violations for purpose of
analysis.
81. Often times a retailer maintains a private-label product that competes directly with a
Category Captain's branded product. See Steiner, supra note 11, at 79. While never definitively
decided by the courts, it seems that in all but the most rare situations the relationship would be
considered vertical. If, for instance, the manufacturer's product and the retailer's private label
were the only two in the category, the relationship would be horizontal and any Category Plan
to agree on prices would be per se illegal. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S.
392 (1927); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Arizona v. Maricopa
County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). For a discussion on differentiating between a horizon-
tal and a vertical relationship, see E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE 490-91 (4th ed. 1999). Furthermore, the Supreme
Court touched upon the vertical-horizontal distinction, in a rather clear-cut case of a manufac-
turer that sold its products both to wholesalers and retailers. United States v. McKesson &
Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956). For the purposes of this Note, a vertical relationship is as-
sumed.
82. The Category Captain may also pay a fee for this privilege. See Merrefield, supra note
26. For a discussion on why this may be problematic, see Parts II.C and III.A.
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use, reject, or alter those recommendations as it sees fit.83 Once the
retailer determines its retail prices, either party may perform the
work necessary to implement the category plan. If a manufacturer
does no more than suggest that a retailer charge a given price, similar
to printing a Manufacturer Suggested Retail Price directly on a prod-
uct label, there is not likely liability under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.84
Nevertheless, as described by at least some large retailers the
Category Captain relationship is one that is inherently collaborative.85
As such, the relationship opens the door for agreements to maintain a
minimum or a maximum resale price. Each scenario yields different
antitrust consequences, presented below.
1. Minimum Resale Price Maintenance
In situations where a manufacturer does not have a monopoly in
a given product category, 6 it may find itself subject to the influence of
a large retailer or retailer cartel with equivalent market power.87 In
such a situation, the individual retailer or cartel may leverage its clout
83. According to Ed Gallina, Executive Director of Category Management for AssociatedWholesale Grocers, "[w]hen you let the category captain run the [category management] plan,there's a problem.... Retailers have to get information from their vendors and then write their
category management plan themselves." Are Captains Antitrust- Worthy?, SUPERMARKET
NEWS, June 9, 20)3, at 18.
84. See generally United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). Under the ColgateDoctrine, a manufacturer may announce a Manufacturer Suggested Retail Price ("MSRP") tothe retailer without taking any further action to influence the retailer to sell at that price. Any
action by which the manufacturer seeks to obtain the retailers agreement to adhere to a resaleprice, however, yields concerted action, and thus triggers the watchful eve of the Sherman Act.
This distinction is easily explained by Section l's requirement of concerted action. Id. However,the courts have not clarified the line between acceptable and unacceptable behavior. For in-
stance, a manufacturer may condition its service or promotional funding on compliance with a
specific resale price. See Acquaire v. Canada Dry Bottling Co. of New York, 24 F.3d 401 (2ndCir. 1994). But see Bender v. Southland Corp., 749 F.2d 1205 (6th Cir. 1984), in which a manu-facturer recommended, but did not mandate, resale prices as part of a franchise agreement. The
manufacturer closely monitored the prices, requiring reporting even when prices remained
stable. The court ruled that this might have been sufficient to violate Section 1. Id.
85. Kevin Hade, Vice-President of Category Management for Ukrop Supermarkets, de-
scribes the relationship as one in which the Captain works with the retailer and potentially other
manufacturers, all to make collaborative category management decisions. FTC Slotting Day 2,
supra note 1, at 325-26.
86. Where the manufacturer has monopoly power in a given product category it is likely to
seek a maximum resale price to obtain the most consumer surplus possible, rather than a mini-
mum price. See Steiner, supra note 11, at 79; see also infra Part IlI.A.2.
87. The recent surge in market concentration has yielded considerable market power in thegrocery segment. See supra note 1. For an example of a large retailer leveraging its scale to
coerce anticompetitive conduct from-in this case multiple, -manufacturers, see Toys "R" US,
Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000).
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to influence the manufacturer to maintain minimum resale prices at
competing retailers. In doing so, the retailer or cartel coerces the
manufacturer to sell its products to other retailers only on the condi-
tion that the retailer does not resell the product for less than an
agreed to price.88 This conduct, known as vertical minimum resale
price maintenance, 9 is a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.90
In 1911, the Supreme Court for the first time ruled that any
agreement to enforce a minimum resale price is a per se violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.9" While minimum resale price mainte-
nance is an old practice, its seminal case, Dr. Miles Medical Company
v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,92 still provides an excellent illustration of
the risks of anticompetitive behavior that may result from retailer
market power and compliant manufacturers.93
In fact, the market conditions leading to Dr. Miles resemble
those currently emerging in the grocery industry.94 Dr. Miles was a
medicine manufacturer 5 that was by its own account quite concerned
88. While it may seem that a manufacturer would impose minimum resale price mainte-
nance, retailers have been shown to do so as well. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE
AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937, at 341 (199t). A manufacturer could attempt to maintain a
minimum resale price is several ways. On the one hand, it could do so explicitly, as discussed in
this Part. On the other hand, the Category Captain could offer inflated price recommendations
to all of its retailers and hope that they would not realize that the recommendations were
inflated. As discussed, infra Part Ill.B, this has at least some chance for success.
89. Vertical simply refers to the fact that the manufacturer and retailer exist at different
stages of the supply chain. Price maintenance, as the name implies, is an agreement to set or fix
prices at an agreed to level. Resale indicates the requirement that the agreement have to do
with the initial purchaser's reselling of the good.
90. 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 341-43 (1987).
91. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373,408-09 (1911). Although
the fact pattern in Dr. Miles presented only minimum resale price maintenance, the Court's
opinion appears to have placed a per se restriction on all resale price maintenance. The court
later confirmed this by so holding in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), a case involv-
ing maximum resale price maintenance. It was not until 1997 that the Court decided that maxi-
mum resale price maintenance was subject only to Rule of Reason analysis, thus overruling
Albrecht, but leaving Dr. Miles intact. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); see infra Part
llI.A.2.
92. 220 U.S. at 373.
93. Congress's initial reaction was to legislate around the result in Dr. Miles by passing the
Miller-Tydings Act, ch. 690, tit. 8, 50 Stat. 673, 693 (1937), authorizing states to permit resale
price maintenance. However, in 1975 Congress repealed the Miller-Tydings Act by passing the
Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975. Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801, returning Dr. Miles to
the much deserved status of controlling precedent.
94. As discussed in this Part, at the time of Dr. Miles, chain grocery stores were emerging
as a market force. Market power was in the hands of independent wholesalers and retailers
acting as cartels. Today, market power is in the hands of individual firms that do not need cartel
agreements to wield their power.
95. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 374.
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with protecting its independent non-chain customers along with its
own good will and reputation. 96 Miles operated in a business envi-
ronment in which a group of retailers acting as a cartel threatened to
boycott manufacturers that did not grant them favorable terms.97
Faced with an onslaught of pressure from new chain store com-
petitors, the National Wholesale Druggists' Association ("NWDA")
and the National Association of Retail Druggists ("NARD"), trade
associations acting as a cartel,98 exerted considerable leverage over
drug manufacturers to maintain minimum resale prices. 99 As part of
their efforts, the NWDA and NARD members agreed to coerce their
suppliers to demand that their resellers charged purchasers a mini-
mum price.100 The NWDA and NARD would then threaten to boy-
cott the manufacturer if it did not concede. 101
To facilitate this, the retail druggists also regularly shared lists of
retailers that undercut the price scheme.02 As such, although it was
not itself part of the cartel seeking minimum resale prices, 103 Dr. Miles
96. Id. at 374-75 (noting that "[Dr. Miles] alleged that most of its sales were made through
retail druggists and that the demand for its remedies largely depended upon their good will and
commendation, and their ability to realize a fair profit").
97. HOVENKAMP, supra note 88, at 341. The favorable terms coerced were somewhatdifferent than one might expect. Unlike today where single giant firms may demand a price
concession, the retailers at the time of Dr. Miles joined together and coerced manufacturers to
maintain minimum resale prices. This collusion enabled small retailers to compete with larger
retailers despite having higher costs. Id.
98. Id. at 341-42, 344-45. NARD was a trade association composed of independent drug
retailers accounting for 90 percent of retail druggists. Id. at 345. NWDA was a trade association
composed of 95 percent of wholesale druggists. Id.
99. Id. at 341-42.
100. Id. at 341.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 345. Nevertheless, there were also countervailing interests; large discounters wereleveraging their massive buying power to induce manufacturers to give discounts greater than
what was justified by cost savings in filling such a large order. 79 CONG. REC. 9077 (1935),
reprinted in 4 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTTRUST LAWS AND RELATED
STATUTES 2930-31 (Earl W. Kintner ed., 1980) [hereinafter ANTITRUST HISTORY].
103. A cartel composed of manufacturers did in fact exist and colluded with NARD andNWDA. See Jayne v. Loder, 149 F. 21, 23-24, 27 (3d Cir. 1906). It is not clear whether Dr. Miles
was a member of this cartel, as no mention is made in the case. Nevertheless, it appears quite
clear that it was the NWDA that exerted the pressure for manufacturers to maintain such aplan. See John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Nat'l Wholesale Druggists' Ass'n, 67 N.E. 136, 137 (N.Y.
Ct. App. 1903).
At a meeting of [NWDA] a plan was devised and adopted for the conduct of the busi-
ness of the sale of proprietary goods, which was in the form of a petition addressed to
the proprietors, asking them to fix a uniform jobbing price for fixed quantities, and
also a selling price by the druggists, which they were to agree to maintain, and that thedruggists should be allowed the difference between the jobbing and the selling price as
their profit or rebate, which they asked should be not less than 10 per cent; the pro-prietors defraying the expenses of boxing and freight to the nearest transportation sta-
tion of the buyer.
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was subject to the considerable influence of the druggist cartel.
Therefore, Dr. Miles had a vested interest in inducing a minimum
retail price from its non-cartel retailers.
In response, Dr. Miles attempted to control the sale and market-
ing of its medicine by mandating retailers sell at a price high enough
for independents to compete.10 4 Specifically, Dr. Miles sold its medi-
cine pursuant to two different contracts-the first a wholesale con-
signment contract 10 5 and the second a retail agency contract", 6-both
of which were designed to control prices long after Dr. Miles relin-
quished title. 107 The consignment contract purported to make retailers
"[w]holesale distributing agents." 108 Under the terms of the agree-
ment, medicine was invoiced to the consignee at a price that matched
the minimum price at which the medicine could then be resold. The
agents simply earned a commission on the invoice price. Further-
more, the consignee was required to agree to sell only to Dr. Miles's
"designated retail agents," and to return all unsold medicine on de-
mand. 109
Likewise, the retail agency contract also contained terms de-
signed to maintain a minimum resale price. Specifically, its terms pre-
vented retailers from selling at a price below that printed on the
medicine itself. Furthermore, its terms also prohibited sellers from
giving quantity discounts and from selling to any wholesaler or re-
tailer not accredited by Dr. Miles." 0
Prior to Dr. Miles, courts took the position that a manufacturer's
attempt to fix retail prices was illegal only to the extent that it facili-
tated collusion amongst retailers."' The pre-Miles theory was that if
one manufacturer set minimum retail prices with a single retailer,
then other retailers would still remain to price-compete.112 The other
ld. Moreover, "[a] manufacturer would ordinarily prefer not to deal with colluding retailers,
because the higher markup by retailers reducelsi the demand for the manufacturer's product."
HOVENKAMP, supra note 88, at 344 (emphasis added). But for the price floor, many of the
smaller druggist could not have made a profit or competed with larger chains. See Nat'l Whole-
sale Druggists' Ass'n, 175 N.Y. at 137. On the other hand, Dr. Miles could have presumably
continued selling to the larger retailers long after the smaller druggists failed.
104. See Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 374-75.
105. Id. at 394.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 395-96.
109. Id. at 396.
110. Id. at 398-99.
111. See, e.g., John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 42-46 (6th Cir. 1907).
112. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 88, at 343.
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retailers acting competitively would provide downward pressure on
price, thus making the agreement between a single retailer and a sin-
gle manufacturer less problematic from an antitrust perspective. Dr.
Miles, however, eliminated this breathing room in the law of vertical
restraints, making all instances of vertical minimum resale prices a
per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.113 Therefore, after
Dr. Miles the existence of potential competing retailers is irrelevant.
Despite several temporarily successful attempts to legislate
around Dr. Miles, it remains good law." 4 The practical effect of Dr.
Miles has been that any agreement between buyer and seller to main-
tain a minimum resale price is illegal. This, of course, precludes a de-
fendant from arguing standard antitrust defenses such as lack of
market power, lack of anticompetitive effects, or any pro-business
justification for its actions. Therefore, any argument that maintaining
a minimum resale price was positive for the manufacturer, its inde-
pendent retailers, or consumers, did not factor into the Dr. Miles
Court's calculus.
Although the Supreme Court has since abandoned its per se ap-
proach to maximum resale price maintenance"' and other non-price
vertical restraints in favor of the more lenient Rule of Reason,"' the
Court has maintained its stance that minimum resale price mainte-
nance is a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.117 Dr.
Miles was a unique case, but quite illustrative of the ease with which
vertical minimum resale price fixing can arise. Because of the nature
of the challenge and the parties involved, the Court properly1 ' ad-
dressed Dr. Miles as an instance of vertical price fixing. As history
shows, however, Dr. Miles was actually a case of independent retail-
ers using their cartel influence to shield themselves from corporate
chains' attempts to leverage their scale to induce lower prices from
manufacturers.
113. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 408-09.
114. See supra note 93.
115. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). For a discussion, see infra Part ilI.A.2.
116. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47-59 (1977) (providing an
excellent discussion of per-se treatment in antitrust law).
117. See, e.g., 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 341-43 (1987).
118. This was the proper approach primarily because Dr. Miles was the plaintiff in the
lawsuit in which it sued its reseller for not maintaining a contractually agreed-to price. It is easy
to conceive of, however, a lawsuit in which NARD or NWDA is sued for its collusive behavior
to fix prices as horizontal actors. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332(1982); see also supra note 81.
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While Dr. Miles is an old case, the market conditions leading to
the antitrust violations therein are far from stale. Considering the
rapidly increasing market power possessed by today's grocers, it is
quite possible that a retailer would wield its power to coerce a manu-
facturer Category Captain to help establish minimum resale prices
amongst competing retailers.1 9 A retailer with market power suffi-
cient to influence a manufacturer may decide that it would benefit
from establishing a price floor for a certain product. If the retailer
acts alone to raise prices above a certain level in a market that it is
not the only seller, a substantial number of consumers might purchase
the product at a competing retailer. As such, the retailer may seek to
have its competitors maintain a similar price floor for the targeted
product. 120
It is here that a manufacturer Category Captain may become
useful.' A retailer may influence a Captain that also serves as Cap-
tain at a competing retailer 2 2 to recommend prices that are higher
than market conditions justify. The retailer may do this on its own, or
in collusion with one or more other retailers. For instance, a large
retailer may attempt to sway its Category Captain to recommend su-
pra-competitive prices to the retailer's competitors that the Captain
also serves. Alternatively, as in Dr. Miles, retailers may act in collu-
119. Furthermore, there is evidence that a Category Captain would be successful in request-
ing a price increase from a retailer. In fact, in a paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the
American Economic Association, Robert L. Steiner discusses encounters in his consulting
practice in which he has learned of Category Captains who have successfully lobbied retailers to
raise prices on their private label products to correspond with price increases on the captain's
branded product. Steiner, supra note 51, at 23. With manufacturers and retailers working hand-
in-hand to maintain price gaps in their own competing products within that single chain, it does
not require a huge leap of faith to imagine an expansion of this conduct to include a competing
chain.
120. Generally speaking, most manufacturers of products in a competitive market want to
keep prices low to increase profits. Nevertheless, the Market Power School of antitrust analysis
contends that the retailer acts as a "gatekeeper," controlling the extent and terms of a manufac-
turer's access to consumers. Edward C. LaRose & Patrick J. Poff, Slotting Allowances and the
Emerging Antitrust Enforcement Debate, 74-Nov. FLA. B.J. 42, 43 (2000), available at
http://www.flabar.org/. In fact, according an executive at Wal-Mart, "in time ... you will see
only two offerings per category on the shelf-the national brand leader and the store brand.
There will be no space available for the second or third brand player in the category." Steiner,
supra note 51, at 10. This access to consumers may present a manufacturer Captain with a
choice of complying, or losing its favorable position at the powerful retailer. When one consid-
ers this in light of the use of slotting fees as a barrier to entry with the potential to limit con-
sumer choice, red flags go up. See, e.g., Gallun, supra note 64, at 17.
121. This is not to say that the retailers could not fix prices without the aid of the Captain.
Certainly retailers can eliminate the middleman and fix prices all on their own.
122. A single manufacturer may serve as Captain at many large retailers. For instance, Del
Monte claims that it serves as Category Captain at almost all of the top twenty-five retailers and
wholesalers, nationwide, for relevant categories. See Urbanski, supra note 5, at S10.
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sion to persuade the Category Captain to recommend supra-
competitive prices to non-participating retailers. In whatever shape or
form the collusion should arise, a challenge should result in a per se
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
2. Maximum Resale Price Maintenance
It is fair to say that in a typical product market a manufacturer
has an incentive to keep resale prices as low as possible in order to
maximize throughput and thereby maximize profits. 23 Accordingly, it
may be most appropriate to view vertical minimum resale price main-
tenance as driven by retailers. In a situation where a manufacturer
that has market power sells to retailers with their own market power,
however, the manufacturer may seek to enforce a maximum resale
price in order to prevent the retailer from exploiting its own market
power to the manufacturer's detriment.124 Unlike vertical minimum
resale price maintenance agreements, the Court has held that vertical
maximum resale price maintenance agreements must only survive a
Rule of Reason analysis for a party to avoid liability under Section 1
of the Sherman Act.125
123. In a competitive product market, a manufacturer will maximize profits by selling the
most goods it possibly can. This is because, in a competitive market the firm is a "price taker,"
selling at whatever price the market will bear. Any increase in price will cause consumers to
substitute away to a different product. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 42, at §1.lb. Nevertheless,
markets are rarely perfectly competitive, and in the world of consumer products retailers and
manufacturers battle for their share of consumer surplus. See id.; see, e.g., Steiner, supra note 11,
at 79-80.
124. This fact enables the manufacturer to keep for itself the majority of a consumer surplus,
while leaving little to the retailer. Without manufacturer-imposed maximum prices, a retailer
with market power can sell at a higher price, thus reducing the total volume of product sold, and
a reduction in corresponding profit to the manufacturer. See Peter Carstensen & David Hart,
Khaning the Court: How the Antitrust Establishment Obtained an Advisory Opinion Legalizing
"Maximum" Price Fixing, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 241, 257 (2003). State Oil Co. v. Khan involved agasoline producer that mandated that its retailers sell for only 3.5 cents above wholesale price.522 U.S. 3, 7-8 (1997). The retailer was free to sell at a higher price, but was contractually obli-
gated to remit all revenue gained from the higher prices back to the producer. Id. at 8. TheSupreme Court ruled that the vertical maximum resale price maintenance agreements are
subject to Rule of Reason analysis. Id. at 18.22. Carstensen & Hart, supra, at 259-65, argue that
the Supreme Court erred in its Khan conclusion, because Khan should not have been viewed as
an independent business, but rather more like a junior partner in partnership with State Oil (or
an employee or agent of State Oil), and, as such, the case should not have raised antitrust con-
cerns.
125. Khan, 220 U.S. at 22. By insisting on applying Rule of Reason analysis, the Court
overruled its 1968 decision in Albrecht v. Herald. Id. Under Rule of Reason analysis the Court
will look at the actual effects of the challenged restraint upon competition: price, quantity, and
consumer choice. Specifically, the court must determine whether the challenged agreement "is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition.... [Trhe court must ordinarily consider thefacts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable." Chicago Bd.
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In State Oil Co. v. Khan,2 6 the Court held that vertical maximum
resale price maintenance is generally beneficial to consumers and that
Rule of Reason analysis would uncover and punish those instances of
maximum price setting that actually produced anticompetitive ef-
fects.127 This leniency in most instances permits a Category Captain to
urge or even coerce a maximum resale price for its products. In fact,
under current doctrine there are few, if any, 28 examples of vertical
maximum resale price maintenance that would violate Section 1 of
the Sherman Act. One such example, however unlikely, would be the
scenario where a manufacturer and retailer collude to maintain a
maximum resale price below marginal cost 29 for the purpose of erect-
ing a barrier to entry or to drive competition from the market. 30
A competitor may sometimes engage in below cost predatory
pricing in order to secure a monopoly in the market and later raise
prices to monopoly level.' 3' Predatory pricing not only can be used as
a means to eliminate a competitor unable to sustain a loss, but also to
discipline a fellow cartel member that has chosen to cut prices. 3 2
B. Sherman Act Section 2
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it an offense for a firm to
monopolize or attempt to monopolize trade or commerce. 33 In a
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Put differently, traditional Rule of Reason
analysis asks: "(1) What is the specific restraint at issue? (2) What are its likely anticompetitive
effects? (3) Are there offsetting procompetitive justifications'? (4) Do the parties have sufficient
market power to make a difference?" California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 782 (1999)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
126. 522 U.S. at 3.
127. Id. at 15-17.
128. One such scenario would be a manufacturer holding a monopoly in a certain good
imposing a maximum resale price on a relatively powerless reseller. See, e.g., Khan, 522 U.S. 3.
Despite the outcome in Khan, Carstensen & Hart, supra note 124, at 259-65, argue that Khan
was not, in fact, such a scenario. Even if this view is correct, the Supreme Court's decision is
binding.
129. In proper formulation prices cannot be set below an "appropriate measure" of costs,
and result in an antitrust violation when the price-cutter has a dangerous probability of recover-
ing its investment in the below cost pricing by later charging a higher price. Brooke Group Ltd.
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 519 U.S. 209, 222-24 (1993).
131). Predatory pricing, when attempted, may be analyzed under either Section 1 or Section
2 of the Sherman Act. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 326, 338
(1990).
131. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 224.
132. See generally id. at 225.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
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competitive market, firms may seek to eliminate their competitors.134
Accordingly, turning over the keys to a retail chain's category man-
agement decisions to a single manufacturer, thus limiting input from
other manufacturers, could lead to numerous violations under Section
2 of the Sherman Act. The most obvious opportunities include a
Category Captain that acts to mislead a retailer by offering less than
accurate data regarding optimal product assortment, placement, pric-
ing, or promotion; 135 and a malicious Category Captain that acts to
sabotage the in-store product or promotional materials of competi-
tors, thus deciding to forego competition on the merits. 136
In a perfect world, firms and their employees are honest and
compete solely on the merits of their product(s) or service(s) and
antitrust laws are unnecessary. Nevertheless, corporations such as
Enron, 137 WorldCom, 38 and Arthur Andersen 39 have adequately
demonstrated that corporations and their employees are all too will-
ing to exhibit behavior that far exceeds the outer boundaries of legal-
ity and acceptable business ethics. 140 In the shadow of these
scandalous undertakings all but the most heinous abuses of a Cate-
gory Captaincy may pass unchallenged or even unrecognized.14
134. The competitive market allows for each player to seek monopoly profits through le-gitimate competitive means. It is only when a firm seeks to gain or maintain monopoly power
through anticompetitive means that antitrust becomes concerned. See generally HOVENKAMP.
supra note 42, at § 1.3. Furthermore, a firm that is the sole supplier of a good necessarily re-
ceives one-hundred percent of the revenues generated in that market. This is necessarily greater
than the share should a competitor exist. As such, a manufacturer has a rational incentive to
eliminate its competitors. This, of course, assumes that businesses are not motivated by any
potential disutility experienced by a competitor that it eliminates.
135. See, e.g., Conwood Co., L.P. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002).
136. Id.
137. In 2002, Enron corporate officials were suspected of or charged with a myriad of viola-
tions of the law and public trust. A brief list includes: securities fraud, illegal kickbacks, tax law
violations, fraud, and surreptitious dealings to manipulate stock price. Peter Behr & Carrie
Johnson, U.S. Plans To Seek New Enron Charges: Accounting Officer, CFO's Wife Targeted,WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2003, at E0I, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn?pagename=article&node=&content ld=A8872-2003Jan31.
138. In 2002, as part of an accounting scandal, Worldcom filed for the largest (at the time of
this writing) bankruptcy in U.S. history, seeking forgiveness of $36 billion in debt. RebeccaBlumenstein & Shawn Young, WorldCom Creditors Back Plan To Reorganize in Bankruptcy,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2003, at Al.
139. Arthur Andersen served as Enron's accounting firm and went so far as to shred docu-
ments to avoid legal consequences. See Ken Brown, When Enron Auditors Were on a Tear,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2002, at COI.
140. Furthermore, a reading of the literature seems to indicate that many lower level em-ployees simply followed orders without questioning the legality of the business directives they
had been issued.
141. For instance, in Conivood Co., L.P. v. United States Tobacco Co., the perpetrating
corporation was able to get away with serious anticompetitive acts before suit was filed. 290
F.3d 768 (2003).
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Retailers often stress that it is necessary for a Category Captain
to be trustworthy, because the retailer would otherwise sever the rela-
tionship. 42 This, however, is nothing more than rhetoric. 143 Certainly if
a Category Captain is completely honest and approaches its work
with only the retailer's best interests in mind then the retailer would
be more than justified in relying on the Category Captain. As
discussed in this Part, however, such a presumption on the part of a
retailer may not be safe or even rational. It seems that if a retailer
were ultimately concerned about perfect accuracy in its Category
Management activities the rational decision would be to staff the
work itself144 and make up the additional costs by carrying only profit-
able brands.1 45 At that point, a manufacturer could eliminate many of
the in-house costs associated with Category Management endeavors
and pass these savings on to its retailers in the form of lower priced
products.146 The retailer could use the savings from lower-priced
products to invest in Category Management programs of their own.1 47
Maybe most importantly, however, the retailer could eliminate all
risk of malfeasance on the part of a Category Captain.
But the world of merchandising and retail decision-making is of-
ten a game played at the margins. A good deal of Category Manage-
ment is based upon data that can be interpreted in a myriad of
different ways.141 Most Category Captains are likely too sophisticated
to tell a retailer that a top-selling brand of deodorant should be
moved to the bottom shelf or that a retailer's private label product
should be discontinued all together, and most retailers are likely too
142. Id. at 775. In Conwood, a retailer asserted that the surest way for a Category Captain to
be shown the door would be to mislead the retailer. Id.
143. There was no evidence that any retailer ever removed the offending Category Captain
from its duties and privileges. See generally Conivood, 290 F.3d at 768.
144. Retailers achieve this either internally, or through an external third party.
145. At minimum, the retailer could seek an outside, disinterested third party to aid in
decision-making.
146. With the current state of market power at the retailer level, they could almost certainly
negotiate a favorable price. By example, Wal-Mart leverages its scale to receive the best possi-
ble price by threatening to stop carrying all or part of a manufacturer's products. See
Borghesani, Jr. et al., supra note 1, at 50.
147. Smaller manufacturers that do not likely receive the Category Captaincy opportunities
would also be entitled to receive the lowered prices, as mandated by the Robinson-Patman Act.
To ensure that the retailer actually performs the Category Management work, the manufacturer
could offer rebates on proportionally equal terms to all retailers.
148. See, e.g., Consvood, 290 F.3d at 776. USTC provided "skewed" data that stressed na-
tional figures instead of more relevant local figures to some of its retailers. Id.
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intelligent to fall into this type of trap. 49 Nevertheless, there is a
strong disincentive for a manufacturer to spend its money on Cate-
gory Management research and labor to then recommend that its own
brand be moved out of the store or relegated to the bottom shelf only
to be replaced by a competing product. 50 This coupled with the fact
that at least some retailers allow their Category Captain to make all
relevant category decisions, 51 creates a situation with both incentive
and opportunity for the Category Captain to take advantage of the
relationship.
A Category Captain could easily recommend that a single, less
significant competing product disappear,152 or that the retailer carry
one of the manufacturer's solid but slower moving products or
brands. 153 The Captain might also suggest that its own slower moving
brand receive better shelving and promotion than would be optimal
for the store. 154
While it may seem unthinkable for a manufacturer to breach a
retailer's trust,15 5 the incentive to do so can be significant. The United
States Tobacco Company ("USTC") was America's leading producer
149. See Albert A. Foer, Divestiture and the Category Captain: New Considerations inMerger Remedies, http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent/153.cfm (Nov. 19, 2001). However, in
Coniwood, retailers either fell for or abided by deceptive practices by the Category Captain. 290
F.3d at 768.
150. The most rational incentive for a manufacturer is to serve as Category Captain for
those retailers where the manufacturer's products are receiving less than optimal distribution,
shelf placement, pricing, or promotion. Otherwise, the manufacturer is better off not spending
resources and free-riding. The question is. really, whether Manufacturer A would elect to serve,
if chosen, as Category Captain, in a store where its product was "second best" from the store's
perspective and where that product was appropriately placed. Theoretically, a manufacturer has
no incentive other than to make certain a second manufacturer does not provide misleading
category information to the retailer, and to improve the efficiency of the overall category. The
only rational reason for a manufacturer, then, not to cede a Category Captaincy opportunity to
a second manufacturer is fear that the Category Captain system is, indeed, flawed, and that the
second manufacturer will mislead the retailer. This, of course, assumes that the first manufac-
turer is honest and will not attempt to provide its product supra-competitive placement, price,
assortment, or promotion.
151. See supra note 59.
152. The manufacturer would make this recommendation because it deems the product to
be a competitive threat in the longer term. This would reduce competition and harm price-
conscious consumers.
153. See, e.g., Conwood, 290 F.3d at 786.
154. Id. This would likely increase volume for that brand, justifying the decision, but could
reduce overall volume for the category. Even if it merely hurts a competitive product, the de-
ceptive manufacturer benefits. See supra note 28.
155. It may be dubious to refer to this as a relationship of trust in situations where the
manulacturer has actually paid money for the "privilege" of serving as Category Captain. See
supra note 26.
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of moist snuff tobacco, 156 and controlled 77 percent of the relevant
product market. 57 Conwood was one of only four competing firms in
the market. 151 In a series of deceptive and malicious abuses of its
Category Captain responsibilities, a capacity in which it served a sig-
nificant number of retailers, USTC took affirmative steps to eliminate
its competitors.159 Specifically, USTC took advantage of its Category
Captain relationship by providing misleading and false Category
Management information and by making it difficult for consumers to
locate competing brands at stores. 60
The benefits to USTC were tremendous. USTC enjoyed the
highest profit margin of any public company in America at the time of
the court's decision, having raised its price an average of eight to ten
percent per year every year between 1979 and 1998.161 Recognizing
that its near-monopoly profits would likely induce others to enter the
market,16 2 USTC erected barriers to entry and sought to eliminate
that competition that already existed. It achieved this by leveraging
its influence as Category Captain in a way that harmed competition
and ultimately consumers.
USTC's first step was simply to convince stores to agree to use
exclusively USTC display racks. 63 But from these humble beginnings,
USTC's relentless pursuit of market share and entry barriers often
156. Conwood, 290 F.3d at 774. Ironically, Conwood and U.S. Tobacco were both created
when a judicial decree broke up its parent, Duke Trust. Id. at 773.
157. Id. at 774. At the time of litigation, Conwood controlled thirteen and one half percent
of the relevant market. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 776-78, 787. USTC's own internal documents indicated that it sought "[to] con-
tinue with [a] Category Management action plan to eliminate competitive products," "to limit
the growth of the price value market segment," to "inhibit competitive growth," and to
"cut[] ... distribution of competitive brands." Id. at 776, 777, 778. In fact, USTC's Chairman
testified that his company had pursued a "strategy of eliminating competitive distribution." Id.
at 787.
160. Id. at 777-80. USTC removed competitors' in store racks and placed competing prod-
uct in USTC racks, making it difficult for customers to locate non-USTC snuff. Id. at 778.
161. Id. at 774. USTC achieved this despite losing market share at a rate of approximately I
percent per year between 1979 and 1998. Id.
162. See id. Despite these high profits, the Conwood court reported that no firm had entered
the market since 1990. Id.
163. Id. at 775. An exclusive display rack means that the moist snuff of all competing manu-
facturers was shelved in a unit created by a single manufacturer, in this case USTC. Id. at 775.
Because of legal restrictions on tobacco advertising, in-store signage was particularly important
for moist snuff -the display rack provides one of the more visible forms of in-store advertising.
Id. at 774. In fact, a USTC competitor noted, "the point at which the buyer makes his purchase
decision is the optimal time to convince the buyer to purchase a particular brand of moist
snuff." Id. Yet in some instances, it was actually the store, itself, which requested the exclusive
rack. Id. at 775.
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turned into activity that blatantly violated Section 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. Focused on a goal of eliminating competing products,
including "price value products" that sold at half the price of its own
products, USTC leveraged its position as Category Captain to abuse
retailer trust.6 4
For instance, USTC provided its retailers with sales data skewed
to the national market rather than more relevant local sales data. 165
This data presented national-level data in a way that masked local
product movement.166 The result was an inaccurate prediction of
moist snuff sales at local stores that unduly favored USTC products. 167
Such a subtle misrepresentation of product data likely appeared per-
fectly legitimate to an untrained eye and may never have been de-
tected. Nevertheless, USTC went one step further and provided false
data, inflated to induce stores to stock a slower moving USTC moist
snuff product and drop competitors' better selling stock-keeping units
("SKUs").168 It even went so far as to inflate actual sales figures.169
Furthermore, USTC's abuse of its Category Captain position did
not end with attempts to mislead retailers into stocking USTC brands.
Where the lower priced products did make it to the retail shelf, USTC
took action to obscure them, such that interested consumers could
not locate them on the store shelves. 70 To accomplish this, USTC
sought to have competing products displayed in USTC labeled
racks. ' Furthermore, USTC frequently removed Conwood display
racks and corresponding point-of-sale materials, going so far as to
schedule store visits when protesting retailer employees were not
164. Id. at 775-76, 777 (noting one USTC employee's observation that "[a]lthough [USTC]
control[sl the merchandising and the POS placements, which will make the consumer awareness
of the price differential difficult, some ... shoppers are always looking for a bargain.").
165. Id. at 776. Retailers based their decisions of which products to carry upon this false
sales data. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.; Mary W. Sullivan, Slotting Allowances and the Market for New Products, 40 J.L. &ECON. 461. 464 (1997). SKU is short for Stock-Keeping Unit. "An SKU uniquely identifies each
product by supplier, brand, size, flavor, and package type. An example of an SKU is Coca-
Cola's caffeine-free 'Fab in 2-liter bottles." Id.
169. Coniwood, 290 F.3d at 776.
170. Id. at 779 (noting that USTC employees "would remove Conwood racks and putConwood's products in USTC racks" and "would remove competitors' racks and bag up their
fresh product and place them under a counter").
171. Id. at 778 (quoting a USTC salesperson that quipped "[e]ven though Conwood does
not like the fact that we sometimes house the product in [USTC vending ... I feel it is better
for them to be lost in our vending").
2004]
CHICAGO-KENT LA IV REVIEW
working.1 72 At times, USTC personnel even destroyed Conwood dis-
play racks.1 73 Finally, USTC entered into exclusive dealing arrange-
ments with retailers, which served to bolster the effects of its abuses
of its Category Captain privileges. 174
When one considers the sheer volume of SKUs a large retailer
faces, it is not difficult to imagine how USTC could get away with
such activities. In the category of moist snuff,175 not even Wal-Mart
has any personnel exclusively dedicated to its management.
176
While USTC's actions are shocking, they are far from unique.
77
USTC did far more than merely walk the sometimes gray line of anti-
trust violation. What is telling is the sheer effort that USTC exuded to
exclude its competitors from the market, not by producing a product
preferential to consumers, but by eliminating consumer choice. The
Conwood case illustrates that retailers trust the top producer in a
category to provide accurate information. 78 While this trust may be
necessary for a continued working relationship, Conwood also pro-
vides warning that manufacturers may be willing to abuse the rela-
tionship at the expense to competing manufacturers, consumers, and
even the retailer.
Moreover, it does not appear as though it were difficult for
USTC to get away with its data manipulations; at least it does not
appear that many retailers were willing to take action. It was not until
one of USTC's competitors complained of abuses that litigation
arose.1 79 Robert Blattberg, Professor of Retailing at Northwestern
University's Kellogg Graduate Business School, explained that few
172. Id. at 779 (recounting testimony from a convenience store clerk who "stated that when
[she complained that a USTC salesman that removed Conwood display racks without store
permission, he] would then come when she was not on duty and remove Conwood racks any-
way").
173. Id. at 778.
174. Id. at 777 (discussing USTC's use of "exclusive vending rights" for the purpose of
"control expanded competitive distribution and competitive POS").
175. Moist snuff accounted for a not so paltry $1.68 billion in 1999. Id. at 774.
176. Id. at 776 (testimony of Robert Blattberg, a category management expert and professor
at Northwestern's Kellogg Graduate Business School).
177. See, e.g., FTC Slotting Day 2, supra note 1, at 348-49. For instance, Pamela Mills, while
working for a tortilla chip manufacturer, experienced a competitor that convinced a retailer to
reduce shelf space for her tortilla chips, when that manufacturer's product had not previously
been a proven winner at the store. See id. Similarly, Frito-Lay has been accused of paying for
more shelf space than it needed to injure competitors. Borghesani, Jr. et al., supra note 1, at 57.
178. Conivood, 190 F.3d at 775.
179. The Conwood case does not expressly indicate what USTC action, specifically, precipi-
tated the litigation. Given the subtlety of many of USTC's action, it was most likely the net
effect of USTC's activities that led Conwood to file suit.
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retailers have sufficient resources to dedicate to monitoring catego-
ries as small as moist snuff.80 When viewed in light of the fact that
retail Category Managers do not likely know as much as the manufac-
turer about the product category and its pricing and profitability,',, it
is not difficult to foresee a situation in which a manufacturer might
stretch the truth to provide its product a favorable position at the
retailer. Had USTC confined its misconduct to the misleading ma-
nipulation of data and the occasional misleading SKU recommenda-
tion, it would likely never have been caught. Moreover, the
significance of such a transgression at a store chain with as much
market throughput as Wal-Mart is substantial. While the billion-
dollar settlement against USTC and the Supreme Court's denial of
certiorari on the verdict182 may give some Category Captains pause,
the relationship's structure will continue to provide similar opportuni-
ties to other manufacturers.
Nevertheless, the level of control and influence that a Category
Captain maintains at the retailer it serves lends itself to potential vio-
lations of both Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The most likely
violations of Section 1 involve attempts to maintain either maximum
or resale prices. Furthermore, a disreputable manufacturer that af-
firmatively misleads a retailer or otherwise sabotages the in-store
efforts of a competitor would very likely violate Section 2.
While it may be relatively easy to recognize decisions that may
violate the Sherman Act, and therefore to avoid them, antitrust con-
cerns may not always be so simple to avoid. Part IV of this Note ex-
plores the Robinson-Patman Act's price discrimination restriction
and the related requirement that manufacturers provide their services
to all retailers on proportionally equal terms. Part V will then provide
recommendations for structuring Category Captain relationships such
that firms might minimize antitrust concerns.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF SECTION 2 OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
ON CATEGORY CAPTAINS
In the field of merchandise distribution a Goliath stands
against divided forces plying a powerful weapon with a skillful hand
against the vulnerable weaknesses of his opponents.
180. Conwood, 190 F.3d at 776.
181. Id.
182. United States Tobacco Co. v. Conwood Co., L.P., 537 U.S. 1148 (2003).
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The Goliath is the huge chain stores sapping the civic life of lo-
cal communities with an absentee overlordship, draining off their
earnings to his coffers, and reducing their independent business
men to employees or to idleness.
His weapon is huge buying power, by the manipulation of
which he threatens manufacturers and others with financial strin-
gency or even bankruptcy if they refuse him the prices and terms he
demands.
His opponents are not only these manufacturers, not only the
independent competitors whom he seeks to eliminate, but the con-
suming public, whom he hopes to have at his mercy.
Their weaknesses, which he renders all the more vulnerable by
playing off their strength against each other, are these:
First. The manufacturers' large overhead, which deepen their
losses from business lost, and magnify their gains on new business
gained.
Second. The decentralization of independent competitors, and
the obstacles which the law raises against them if they attempt
organized resistance to those manufacturers who seek to make up
from them the net profits which they lose on the chains.
Third. The disorganized individualism and hand-to-mouth buy-
ing habits of the purchasing public, who cannot realize nor fore-
see-nor indeed, resist if they could-the merchandising tactics of
the chains -practices which, because of their far-flung resources,
they can concentrate with more deadly effect in one community at
the cost of another. 183
These are the words of Representative Wright Patman, 114 prof-
fered to the House of Representatives on June 11, 1935 as part of his
bill to amend Section 2 of the Clayton Act.185 With a few minor aug-
mentations, sparing the hyperbole, and adding to the mix larger
manufacturers, one might mistake this for a present day Federal
Trade Commission'86 report on the state of the grocery industry.
In the Pre-Robinson-Patman Act 1930s, independent grocers
were seeing their business slowly erode to the coercive practices of
rapidly emerging chain stores. 18 7 Specifically, large chains used their
size to coerce quantity discounts above and beyond what was justified
183. ANTITRUST HISTORY, supra note 102, at 2927.
184. Id. at 2926. Although offered by Representative Patman in his name, the bill was actu-
ally written by former Department of Justice attorney H.B. Teegarden. Id. at 2933.
185. Id. at 2926.
186. The F.T.C's David Balto has expressed the commission's willingness to enforce the Act
should a proper challenge be brought. See FTC Slotting Day 2, supra note 1, at 459460.
187. As discussed in Part III.A.t, the independent sellers did not, themselves, react gra-
ciously.
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by the actual economies of scale of order size. 8' Large corporate
chains also coerced rebates from manufacturers, rationalized under
the proposition that they were "advertising allowance[s]" or "broker-
age" fees to cover the chain's adverting costs. 189 As such, the Robin-
son-Patman amendment to the Clayton Act came into being explicitly
as a means to allow all manufacturers, big or small, the opportunity to
sell their goods free from retailer coercion, and to prevent the even-
tual monopolization of grocery business by large chains. 190
At the time, chain stores accounted for one in every ten physical
stores, and one in five dollars worth of merchandise sold. 191 Between
1926 and 1933 chain stores' percentage of retail sales increased from 9
to 25 percent. 9 2 In terms of groceries, corporate grocery chains ac-
counted for 52,514 stores,'93 while voluntary and cooperative chains
operated approximately 53,000 stores. 9 4 Furthermore, manufacturers
were not seen as being an evil from which consumers needed protec-
tion. 195
Today, grocery retailers are again accumulating market power.
Between 1987 and 2000 the market share controlled by the four larg-
est grocery chains increased from 17.0 to 27.4 percent of the national
market.9 6 William H. Borghesani, Jr. and his colleagues at Keller and
188. See ANTITRUST HISTORY, supra note 102, at 2931.
189. Id. (noting that the small independent stores did not have the leverage to coerce in-
kind payments).
190. Id. at 293!)-31 (noting that large chains may offer consumers lower prices in the short
run, but that once small competitors were driven out, higher prices and oppression would fol-
low). In choosing to act before large chain stores' power it got out of control, Congress mayhave learned its lesson from Standard Oil. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221U.S. 1 (1911). Standard Oil was a large oil producer and a mammoth consumer of railroadfreight. Because of the large amount of business it did, Standard Oil was able to coerce from its
railroad freight suppliers a fifty percent rebate on its own freight. as well as fifty percent of the
revenues that the railroads realized from Standard Oil competitors. WALTER ADAMS & JAMES
W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX: INDUSTRY, LABOR, AND GOVERNMENT IN THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY 137-39 (1986). Standard Oil provides an excellent example of whathappens when Congress fails to act quickly to restore competitive market structures once they
break down. See generally id. Similarly, in slightly more modern times the Supreme Court has
espoused that Congress leveraged the Robinson-Patman Act to prohibit large firms from "se-
curling] a competitive advantage over a small buyer solely because of the large buyer's quantity
purchasing ability." FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37,43 (1948).
191. ANTITRUST HISTORY, supra note 102, at 2958. This is, apparently, all retail, not just
grocery.
192. JOSEPH CORNWALL PALAMOUNTAIN, JR., THE POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION 7 (1955).
193. ANTITRUST HISTORY, supra note 102, at 2959. The top three corporate grocery chains
account for approximately 24,000 stores. Id.
194. Id. A voluntary or cooperative chain was created when a number of independent storesgroup together as an independent merchants association in order to buy in quantity. Id. at 2934.
195. Id. at 2948.
196. See supra note 1.
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Heckman have argued, however, that the appropriate measure of
market power for American grocers is at a regional level, where mar-
ket share of the four largest chains has risen from 49.3 percent in 1.958
to 62.4 percent in 1987 in metropolitan areas with more than one mil-
lion residents. 9 7 In contrast, economics Professors William Hildred
and James Pinto assert that because consumers shop only in local
economic markets, a proper analysis should focus on local concentra-
tion ' In fact, local market concentration often may be even higher
than national figures.1 99 For instance, in 1998 the four-firm market
concentration was greater than 90 percent in the Buffalo-Niagara
Falls market, while exceeding 73 percent in Hartford, 68 percent in
Cleveland-Akron, and 66 percent in the Boston-Worcester-Lawrence
market.2 00
While the current political climate is different than in Senator
Patman's era, the economic factors made evident in his prose have
returned to the forefront of American reality. As such, as mega-
retailers begin to leverage their size, manufacturers may find them-
selves tempted to provide greater services with the products they
sell2°1 and, in doing so, violate the Robinson-Patman Act, as discussed
in this Part.2 °2
The Supreme Court has explained that Congress implemented
the Robinson-Patman Act because Congress "considered it to be an
evil that a large buyer could secure a competitive advantage over a
small buyer solely because of the large buyer's quantity purchasing
ability. 2 03 The injuries Robinson-Patman seeks to prevent include
"the use of quantity price differentials [unrelated to] actual cost dif-
ferences [in order to prevent such discounts from being used as] in-
struments of favor and privilege and weapons of competitive
197. Borghesani, Jr. et al., supra note 1, at 45-46.
198. William Hildred & James Pinto, Impacts of Supply Chain Management on Competition
2 (Northern Arizona Univ. working paper, Apr. 2002), available at http://www.cba.nau.edu/
faculty/workingpapcrs/pdf/Hildred_2SCMonComp.pdf.
199. See Albert A. Foer, Food Retailing: The Two Faces Of Supermarket Mergers,
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent/37.cfm (Aug. 26, 1999).
200. Id. at n.9.
201. See, e.g., Nancy Griffin, Polls Reveal Service Gaps Between Retailers and Suppliers,
SUPERMARKET NEWS, June 4, 2001, at 54, reproduced at http://www.perishablesgroup.com/
industry-articles/010604_pollsrevealgaps.html. With the recent increase in market concentra-
tion, retailers have begun to demand more than just a good product. Id.
202. This carries a potential concomitant violation of Section 2(f) on the part of the retailer.
15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (2000).
203. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37,43 (1948).
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oppression. ' '20° In short, the Act was implemented to prevent "large
buyers [that] dominate a market in which many suppliers compete for
sales [from] forc[ing] the suppliers to sell at such low prices as to pre-
vent new buyers from entering the market. ' 205
As it reads today, Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act pro-
vides that "[i]t [is] unlawful for any [firm] to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities of like grade and
quality. '2 °6 While price differentials are rather easy to spot, Congress
was sophisticated enough to recognize that a manufacturer could
charge all purchasers the same price, yet achieve price discrimination
by offering valuable services and facilities to some purchasers and not
others. As such, Section 2(e) of the Act prohibits a manufacturer
from providing valuable services or facilities to purchasers unless such
are offered to each purchaser on proportionally equal terms.207 Fi-
nally, Congress recognized that it is sometimes the buyer that seeks
the prohibited price differential. Therefore, Section 2(f) of the
Robinson-Patman Act restricts buyers, here retailers, from knowingly
receiving discriminatory prices. 08 As such, any attempt by a retailer to
204. Id. at 43-44 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 74-2287, at 9 (1936)).
205. Hoover Color Corp. v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1999).
206. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000); see FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 550 (1960).Section 2(a) prohibits discrimination directly on price, a practice that is not directly tied to the
Category Captain relationship and therefore not further explored in this Note.
207. 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (2000). Section 2(e) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser against
another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale, with or withoutprocessing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnishing
of, any services or facilities connected with the processing, handling, sale, or offering
for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on
proportionally equal terms.
Id. Furthermore, The Fred-Meyer Guides, found at 16 C.F.R. § 240 et seq. (2004), provide
ample detail and examples as to the meaning of "proportionally equal" terms. Id. Essentially, a
manufacturer may offer a certain amount of service or allowance for each dollar or unit sold.
but may not have a logarithmically or exponentially expanding formula, such that bigger pur-
chasers always receive better terms that are not justified from cost savings associated with suchlarge orders. Section 2(e), along with Section 2(d), was designed to prohibit price discrimination
in the form of advertising and promotional allowance. While 2(e) prohibits the manufacturer
from directly "[flurnishing services or facilities," 2(d) prohibits a seller from "[play[ing] for
services or facilities." Id. at §13(d); see FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 350-53 (1968);
George Huag Co. v. Rolls Royce Motor Cars, Inc., 148 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1998).
208. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (2000). Section 2(f) provides that "It shall be unlawful for any person
engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a dis-
crimination in price which is prohibited by this section." Id. While § 2(f by its text applies onlyto price discrimination, case law has leveraged § 5 of the F.T.C. Act to apply Section 2(f) to
violations of Sections 2(d) and 2(e). Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2nd Cir. 1962).
Section 2(d) makes it illegal for manufacturers to pay retailers for facilities or services the
manufacturer makes equivalent payments available on proportionally equal terms to all other
competing retailers. 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (20W)). Although there are limitations in its applicability,
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extract special treatment from a manufacturer Category Captain may
present Robinson-Patman complications.
While it may appear that the legal inability to charge different
customers different prices may hinder firms, Congress accounted for
this as well. Section 2(b) provides an affirmative defense to violations
of Section 2(a) and Section 2(e) for firms that price discriminate for
the sole purpose of competing with a second price-cutting firm. This
"meeting competition defense" precludes liability when the "lower
price or the furnishing of services or facilities [is] made in good faith
to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or
facilities furnished by a competitor. ' 209 Furthermore, firms are permit-
ted to argue that price differentials were cost-justified when faced
with a Section 2(a) challenge, but are not when charged with a viola-
tion of Section 2(e).2 11
Exactly what constitutes a service or facility is relatively intuitive,
and the Code of Federal Regulations lists category management types
of services as included in the Act's restrictions. These include: "Co-
operative advertising; Handbills; Demonstrators and demonstrations;
Catalogues; Cabinets; Displays; Prizes or merchandise for conducting
promotional contests; Special packaging, or package sizes,"21' related
to the reselling of a good. 212 Therefore, in practice it appears that to
avoid a prima facie violation of Section 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman
Act a Category Captain must provide its services to all competing
retailers on proportionally equal terms.
213
for the purposes of this discussion Section 2(f) is treated as though it expressly prohibits a buyer
from knowingly receiving or inducing discriminatory services under Section 2(e).
209. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (2000). The Supreme Court has noted that:
In most situations, a showing of facts giving rise to a reasonable belief that equally low
prices were available to the favored purchaser from a competitor will be sufficient to
establish that the seller's lower price was offered in good faith to meet that price. In
others, however, despite the availability from other sellers of a low price, it may be ap-
parent that the defendant's low offer was not a good-faith response.
Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 439 (1983) (emphasis added); see
also Walker v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 1335, 1340-41 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (holding, inter
alia, that a supplier may offer one customer a larger value of promotional materials than a
second if the supplier relies on a trusted source's personal knowledge that its competitor is
providing the first customer with a similar deal). The "meeting competition defense," as it is
called, simply means that the firm acted the way it did because its competitor did so first and in
order to remain competitive, the first firm needed to respond in kind.
210. WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUSr LAW HANDBOOK 546-47 (2002 ed. 2001).
211. 16 C.F.R. § 240.7 (2004).
212. Id. at § 240.2(a)(5) (2004).
213. A Section 2(e) violation also requires that the services provided be related to the resale
of goods. Category Management services, by definition, meet this requirement. As discussed,
however, Section 2(e) violations do permit for a meeting competition defense. Nevertheless, it is
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While the Federal Trade Commission, through the Fred Meyer
Guides,214 provides ample explanation for what constitutes propor-
tionally equal terms,215 case law provides little instruction on how the
Guides should be applied to Category Management type services.216
The Fred Meyer Guides were developed as a reaction to discrimina-
not at all clear that Category Captains could use the defense on an ongoing basis as a guise to
continuously price discriminate.
214. 16 C.F.R. § 240.1 (2004) (instructing that "The purpose of [the Fred-Meyer] Guides is
to provide assistance to businesses seeking to comply with sections 2 (d) and (e) of the
Robinson-Patman Act").
215. Id. at § 240.9. This Section provides that:
(a) Promotional services and allowances should be made available to all competing
customers on proportionally equal terms. No single way to do this is prescribed by law.
Any method that treats competing customers on proportionally equal terms may be
used. Generally, this can be done most easily by basing the payments made or the ser-
vices furnished on the dollar volume or on the quantity of the product purchased dur-
ing a specified period. However, other methods that result in proportionally equal
allowances and services being offered to all competing customers are acceptable.
(b) When a seller offers more than one type of service, or payments for more than one
type of service, all the services or payments should be offered on proportionally equal
terms. The seller may do this by offering all the payments or services at the same rate
per unit or amount purchased. Thus, a seller might offer promotional allowances of up
to 12 cents a case purchased for expenditures on either newspaper advertising or
handbills.
Id.
216. While there appears no case law directly on point, case law in similar situations suggests
that a court faced with a challenge would require the Captain manufacturer to demonstrate that
it offered services on a proportionally equal basis. See. e.g., Alterman Foods, Inc. v. FTC, 497
F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that "a wholesaler and retailer of groceries and household
products violates the Federal Trade Commission Act by inducing its suppliers, at their own
expense, to participate in a food show for its buyers and customers, knowing that the suppliers
did not so cooperate with its competitors"). The FTC has since signaled its disagreement with
the Alterman court's reasoning, but primarily on the grounds that the challenged trade show
services did meet the Act's requirement that the discrimination relate directly to the resale of
goods. In re. Gibson, No. 9016, 1980 WL 338971, at *1, *181 (F.T.C. April 30, 1980).
Section 2(d) does not refer to benefits to 'favored buyers' in connection with the origi-
nal sale to the buyer, such as discounts, nor does it refer to a seller who charges differ-
ent prices to different buyers according to the qualification or functional level of the
buyer; rather it refers to payments in connection with the resale by the buyer of the
goods, for advertising, promotion or other similar purposes.
Id.; see also In re. Max Factor & Co., No C-3201, 1986 WL 722142 (F.T.C. Oct. 15, 1986) (chal-
lenging Max Factor's "paying or contracting to pay to or for the benefit of any customer any-
thing of value as compensation or in consideration for advertising or promotional services or
facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection with the advertising," the FTC
held that under § 2(d) a manufacturer must provide alternatives such as "handbills and circulars
[1, or other in-store promotional activities"). Moreover, paying retailers for advertising has been
recognized by courts to be a means of achieving indirect price discrimination. See Hygradc Milk
& Cream Co., Inc. v. Tropicana Products, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 2861, 1996 WL257581, at *1, *3(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1996); American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 135 F.
Supp. 2d 1031, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (noting that "[a] promotional allowance provided by a
seller to a buyer that bears little relationship to the buyer's actual advertising costs provides a
cash windfall to the favored buyer and, thus, can only be viewed as a reduction in the buyer's
cost of goods"). Given courts' focus on the value conferred to retailers as a means of indirect
price discrimination it is not a stretch to conceive of a challenge to disproportional value con-
ferred by means of Category Management services.
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tory price discounts received by the Fred Meyer grocery chain.2 17
They provide recommendations on how a grocer or manufacturer can
effectively comply with the requirements of the Robinson-Patman
Act. While they do not have the force of law, the Guides instruct that,
[a] seller who makes employees available or arranges with a third
party to furnish personnel for purposes of performing work for a
customer should make the same offer available on proportionally
equal terms to all other competing customers or offer useable and
suitable services or allowances on proportionally equal terms to
competing customers for whom such services are not useable and
suitable.2 18
Despite the lack of case law so mandating, the Guides make it rela-
tively clear that a manufacturer needs to be certain that if it chooses
to serve as a Category Captain for a large retailer it also makes avail-
able at least some category management services to even its smallest
customers.
Nevertheless, while case law does not directly instruct a manufac-
turer how to create a program that offers Category Management ser-
vices on proportionally equal terms, it does instruct that the services
must be similar in kind and magnitude. 19 When camera manufacturer
Minolta instituted a program by which it provided its preferred retail-
ers with free advertising, free cameras and camera equipment, and
free promotions, non-preferred camera retailer Alan's of Atlanta
sued. 20 Minolta desired to focus its marketing and merchandising
efforts on its largest retailers, seeking to increase its efficiency. 21 The
value of benefits that Minolta provided to preferred customers
amounted to nearly $0.03 for every dollar worth of Minolta goods the
customer purchased. Minolta also offered the plaintiff financial bene-
fits in the form of favorable credit terms, but only in the range of
$0.0087 for every dollar in Minolta goods purchased.22
The court asserted that the programs' terms were not propor-
tionally equal for three reasons. First, the credit terms provided to
Alan's of Atlanta were different in kind from the free goods and
217. See FFC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968).
218. 16 C.F.R. § 240.9(b) (Example 5) (2004).
219. See Alan's of Atlanta, Inc. v. Minolta Corp., 903 F.2d 1414 (11 th Cir. 1990).
220. Id. at 1416.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1422-23.
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promotional funds provided to Minolta's preferred customers. 223 Sec-
ond, Minolta's program prohibited the plaintiff from participating in
the favored programs, but did not exclude favored retailers from re-
ceiving the same favorable credit terms as Alan's of Atlanta. 224 Fi-
nally, the programs were not proportionally equal because they
provided vastly different value as a ratio to dollars spent on Minolta
goods.225
Alan's of Atlanta provides guidance to Category Captains seek-
ing to comply with the mandates of the Robinson-Patman Act. It first
teaches that the Category Management services or programs that it
provides to smaller retailers must be similar in kind to those offered
to larger retailers. For instance, it would likely be problematic to offer
Category Management planning and implementation services to one
retailer, but only favorable credit or delivery terms to a second. Sec-
ond, it instructs that it is not sufficient to merely provide smaller re-
tailers with what may seem like a fair alternative program. Rather, it
is necessary to take the extra step to calculate the value of services it
provides as Category Captain and the value of lesser services, and
then determine a way to offer them on an equal basis. This may pre-
sent problems when a single manufacturer provides identical Cap-
taincy services to two large retailers that purchase a measurably
different quantity or dollar value worth of goods.
With the recent increase in market concentration amongst con-
sumer product retailers, market conditions resemble those feared by
Representative Patman when he devised the Robinson-Patman Act.
Patman was concerned with large retailers leveraging their scale to
coerce from manufacturers price cuts that were not justified by in-
creased order size. Certainly, in light of Captaincy fees charged by
some retailers, one interpretation of the Category Captain relation-
ship is that it may be a veiled attempt to exude indirect price dis-
crimination from manufacturers. Nevertheless, market power in the
manufacturing sector may provide still another explanation-a desire
to gain favorable treatment at the retailer.
Many firms, however, are interested simply in improving the effi-
ciency of a retailer's product categories. Manufacturers must there-
223. Id. at 1424. The court determined that there was an inherent difference between credit
terms, used to purchase a good, and thus not within the purview of Sections 2(d) and 2(e), and
advertising and promotional programs, which directly relate to the resale of goods. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. The court in Alan's of Atlanta did not assert that retailers must always provide
benefits in exact proportions, but rather that this was a benchmark.
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fore devise Category Management programs that ensure proportion-
ally equal service to all customers. Part V of this Note provides sev-
eral recommendations.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Category management is, at least for now, a practice deeply en-
trenched in the supermarket industry, and as a business practice pre-
sents a valuable means by which a retailer may navigate through an
endless maze of seemingly identical products. Nevertheless, the gray-
ing of the once bright line between vertical and horizontal relation-
ships presents a unique challenge for antitrust practitioners. There is,
without a doubt, an opportunity for vertically related firms to col-
laborate for mutual benefit but each needs to monitor their activity to
ensure that each complies with both the Sherman Act and the
Robinson-Patman Act. Parties should be careful to structure their
relationships in a way that achieves the benefits of the Category Cap-
tain relationship, but minimizes the anticompetitive risk.
The directives of the Sherman Act are quite benign, and even the
least sophisticated manufacturers and retailers should have no trouble
adapting their business practices to comport with them. First and
foremost, manufacturers and retailers should resist the temptation to
collaborate in setting retail prices. 2 6 This practice is ripe for antitrust
litigation, much of which yields a per se violation of the Sherman
Act.227 Nevertheless, some minor business process reengineering can
serve to minimize risks. Firms can still benefit from the collaborative
nature of the Category Captain relationship without ever discussing
price. For instance, a manufacturer could train any given retailer to
perform the necessary calculations on its own and, where applicable,
provide promotional funds to pay for data costs. 28 The manufacturer
could also provide the retailer with third-party software to perform
the necessary calculations.29 Under this scenario, the Category Cap-
tain would still provide the manufacturer with beneficial Category
226. Supra Part IV.
227. Id.
228. This, of course, is a perfectly legal alternative. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United
States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
229. See, e.g., AC Nielsen, What is Priceman?, http://www.acnielsen.com/products/tools/
priceman/ (discussing AC Nielsen Priceman software that enables firms to make data-based
pricing decisions) (last visited March 14, 2(X)4).
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Management services but would not proffer direct price recommen-
dations.
Secondly, retailers should take affirmative steps to monitor
manufacturers to ensure ethical behavior, as the retailer itself may
become liable for a supplier's behavior under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Although there is a fine line between vigorous compe-
tition and antitrust violation, it seems relatively apparent when the
line has been crossed. Retailers possess numerous means by which to
achieve this. At minimum, the retailer could seek input from compet-
ing manufacturers to ensure accurate category recommendations.2 30
Retailers could also eliminate all Category Captain relationships
and instead demand better prices, using the savings to staff stronger
category management teams to make such decisions internally.23 This
scenario would make it simple to remove all possibility of collusive
behavior, as the retailer would assume responsibility for Category
Management decisions.232 This is less appealing, however, to the
manufacturer, as it provides no guarantee that a retailer will invest
the savings into Category Management. To rectify this dilemma,
manufacturers could instead provide promotional funds conditioned
on Category Management activities. This would permit the manufac-
turer a degree of certainty that the funds are paid for the Category
Management work and not for favorable shelf space, as well as the
flexibility to revoke funding if they are not.
Furthermore, the retailer could instead demand that the Cate-
gory Captain manufacturer itself fund an independent external con-
sultant. In this scenario, it would be useful for the manufacturer to
provide funds to the retailer, which would then pay the consultant. 23
230. This is the practice of the Ukrop supermarket chain. FTC Slotting Day 2, supra note 1,
at 354.
231. While it may be true that under present business structures, manufacturers may be a
more natural fit to specialize in their category than a retailer, see generally Steiner, supra note
11, at 80, it very well may be that this is because the retailers have not been asked to perform
the work on their own. It is likely that manufacturers are better because they have more
employees dedicated to each relevant category. Certainly, retailers are capable of managing
categories on their own. For instances, the Stop & Shop grocery chain does not make use of
Category Captains or lead manufacturers, but relies on its own personnel to reach decisions. See
FTC Slotting Day 2, supra note 1, at 326-27.
232. This would also make it much easier for a manufacturer to comply with Robinson-
Patman requirements.
233. Third party Category Management companies are quite prevalent. A brief Internet
search reveals numerous options. On the strategy and planning side, there is AC Nielsen, see
http://acnielsen.com/services/category/camansol.htm (discussing AC Nielsen's various consulting
services), and Winston & Weber Associates, Inc., see http://www.winstonweber.com/. On the in-
store implementation side there is the Merchandising Corporation of America, see
2(041
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This would eliminate any aversion on behalf of the third party to pro-
vide inaccurate work in a desire to please the party footing the bill. 34
It seems that this scenario does the most to eliminate risk of each
party abusing the relationship. The independent consultant would
work for the retailer, as the Category Captain claims to do, and the
manufacturer would still absorb the cost. In this scenario, there is no
opportunity for manufacturer and retailer to collude on price. There
is also no incentive for the third-party Category Manager to deceive
the retailer.
While it is relatively clear how to alter the Category Captain rela-
tionship to comply with the Sherman Act, comporting with the Rob-
inson-Patman Act is somewhat less clear-cut, primarily because there
is little case law by which to guide business decisions. Nevertheless,
the same modifications to Category Captain that would serve to en-
sure compliance with the Sherman Act programs will aid in compli-
ance with the Robinson-Patman Act. The safest bet, of course, would
be for retailers to staff stronger category management teams to make
such decisions internally and demand better prices from manufactur-
ers.
As with compliance with the Sherman Act, however, the most ef-
fective paradigm is for a manufacturer to fund a third party Category
Manager. 23 5 Here, it would be simple to measure the exact value of
the service provided to each retailer. Therefore, determining whether
the services are provided on proportionally equal terms would be
much easier than today. Furthermore, Congressional or Administra-
tive action may be necessary to clarify the boundaries. Most helpful
would be an updated version of the Fred-Meyer guidelines focusing
on Category Management services.
In the end, a balance needs to be reached whereby the most effi-
cient actor performs retail-level Category Management decisions in a
way that best serves consumers and protects competition. The safest
way from an antitrust perspective is to shift the work back to the re-
tailer or to a third party.
http://mcaretail.com/services/index.asp, R&R Marketing Services, Inc., see
http://www.rrmarketingservices.com/wst-page5.html, and National In-Store, see http://www.nis-
online.com/merchandising.asp.
234. Tosh, supra note 23, at 90 (relating the view of one expert that "a third-party company
is 'directed by the retailer' and does not have a vested interest in one particular branded prod-
uct").
235. See supra note 232.
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